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Setting Standards for Fair Information
Practice in the U.S. Private Sector
Joel R. Reidenberg*
INTRODUCTION
The Information Superhighway in the United States and the emerging
Global Information Infrastructure place standards for the treatment of
personal information at the forefront of policy discussions among
businesses, governments, and citizens.1 Because the control of information
means power, standards for the treatment of personal information have
significant societal implications. Legal rules, industry norms, and business
practices collectively form these standards. Financially, the standards for
the control of flows of personal information have a large economic impact
Businesses rely on personal information for activities ranging from back-
office personnel management to product sales. Standards allocate both
economic benefits and burdens. Politically, adequate standards for the
treatment of personal information are a necessary condition for citizen
participation in a democracy! Since ancient Greece, a citizen's right to
* ©Joel R. Reidenberg, 1995. Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law.
A.B., Dartmouth 1983; J.D., Columbia .1986; D.E.A., Univ. de Paris I (Pantheon-Sorbonne)
1987. An earlier version of this Article was presented at the Annenberg Conference on
Information Privacy and the Public Interest (Washington, D.C., Oct. 6, 1994). Sections I and
I were inspired by a discussion at the Fordham Faculty Scholarship Colloquium. Sections II
and IV draw extensively on my work for the Study of American Data Protection Law, a report
for the European Commission with Professor Paul M. Schwartz, under the direction of
Professor Spiros Simitis. I would like to thank profoundly Paul Schwartz and Spiros Simitis for
their endless encouragement and thoughtful comments and Carl Felsenfeld, Martin Flaherty,
James Fleming, Robert Kaczorowski, Steve Thel, and William Treanor for their insightful
reviews of an earlier draft. I am also grateful for the valuable research assistance provided by
Frangoise Garnet, Laura Sigal, Daniel Mollin, and Daniel Galpem. I remain responsible for all
errors and omissions. Fordham University School of Law Faculty Research Grants supported
work on this Article.
1. Se, e.g., Information Infrastructure Task Force, National Information Infrastructure:
Agenda for Action 9-10 (Sept. 1993); Europe and the Global Information Society:.
Recommendations to the European Council 18 (May 26, 1994), available on Internet World
Wide Web at http:://www.earn.net (also known widely as the Bangemann Report).
2. "Legal rules" consist of statutory mandates, regulatory obligations, and court
decisions. "Industry norms" come from business sector aspirations and expectations. "Businems
practice" describes the actual treatment of information in commercial contexts rather than a
legally mandated treatment or an aspiration goal.
3. See Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 707.
732-37 (1987). During the Middle Ages in Europe, serfs were also denied the right to exprmss
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participate in society has depended on the ability to control the disclosure
of personal information.4 Without appropriate standards, citizens may be
unduly constrained in their interactions with society. Socially, the
treatment of personal information is an element of basic human dignity.
Fair treatment of personal information accords respect to an individual's
personality. Standards, thus, structure social relationships.
The terminology for standards of fair information practice has been
poorly defined in the United States. The term "privacy" is often used to
describe the allocation of rights to personal information.5 This rhetoric is
confusing. "Privacy" serves as a catch-all term, protecting a variety of
interests ranging from government intrusion into the bedrooms to the
inviolability of telephone communications! Although fair information
practices may be subsumed under the broad "privacy" label, the standards
represent a narrower and distinct interest maintaining the integrity of
personal information and fairness to the individuals about whom the data
relates. Specifically, such standards apply to the collection, storage, use,
and disclosure of personal information.
For the business community, the U.S. standards for the treatment of
personal information have never been more important. For almost twenty
years, industry has avoided the imposition of legal rules through the
promotion of self-regulatory policies! Yet, in the last few years, both the
development of industry norms and the implementation of appropriate
business practices for self-regulation, as well as the consensus on a self-
regulatory model, have broken down. Public opinion no longer views
industry treatment 6f personal information as benign, and Congress is
waking up from years of dormancy. At the same time, Europe is exerting
an opinion because they had no control over access to property and consequently no control
over the flow of information from that space. See Blaise Lemper, Informatique et Democratie
19 (1987) (stating that the droit a laparol--the right to participate in public debate-was only
accorded to those with rights to exclude others from access to property or a private space). In
essence, the rules for access to and use of personal information determine the extent and
quality of a citizen's participation in democracy.
4. See Lemper, supra note 3, at 19 (noting that a Greek citizen needed to control a
'private" space in order to participate in public life). In essence, privacy is a precondition for
democracy. Colin J. Bennett, Regulating Privacy. Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe
and the United States 32 (1992).
5. See, e.g., Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967).
6. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
7. See, ag., Telecommunications Network Security- Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d
Cong., Ist Sess. 31-41 (1993) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Raymond G. Kammer,
Acting Director, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Dept. of Commerce)
(discussing the use of the Clipper Chip to assure that the nation's telecommunications
infrastructure was compatible with wiretaps); see also Jaleen Nelson, Note, Sledge Hammers
and Scalpels: The FBI Digital Wiretap Bill and its Effect on Free Flow of Information and
Privacy, 41 UCLAL Rev. 1139, 1147-55 (1994).
8. See, eg., U.S. Privacy Protection Study Comm'n, Personal Privacy in an Information
Society (1977) [hereinafter Privacy Comm'n].
[1995]
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greater pressure on companies with global information needs. After a
decade of little activity, foreign countries have begun to restrict
information flows to destinations perceived as lacking sufficient standards.
The European Union's proposed Council Directive on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data has further renewed international debate on the
treatment of personal information by U.S. businesses.9
The confluence of plans for an Information Superhighway, actual
industry self-regulatory practices, and international pressure dictate
renewed consideration of standard setting for fair information practices in
the U.S. private sector. The legal rules, industry norms, and business
practices that regulate the treatment of personal information in the United
States are organized in a wide and dispersed manner. This Article analyzes
how these standards are established in the U.S. private sector.
Part I argues that the U.S. standards derive from the influence of
American political philosophy on legal rule making and a preference for
dispersed sources of information standards. American standards are
characteristically ad hoc and narrowly targeted. The driving force behind
such narrow fair information practice standards is the philosophy that
government should be limited and that a "marketplace of ideas" allows
only minimal restrictions on flows of information, including personal
information. As a corollary, this philosophy encourages dispersion in
standard-setting authority. Part I consequently sets out the variety of
sources for standards in the absence of general legal rules for fair
information practice.
Part II examines the aggregation of legal rules, industry norms, and
business practice from these various decentralized sources. This Article
proposes that standards must be considered in the context of particular
situations. This section draws on a checklist of commonly accepted,
international principles of fair information practices and analyzes several
contexts in key industrial sectors to understand the sufficiency of U.S.
rules, norms, and practices. This Part concludes that important deficiencies
exist in the U.S. treatment of personal information. Moreover, these
deficiencies are significant in light of foreign scrutiny of international data
flows.
Part III ties the deficiencies back to the underlying U.S. philosophy
and argues that the adherence to targeted stahdards has frustrated the very
purposes of the narrow, ad hoc regulatory approach to setting private
sector standards. This section argues that instead of minimizing the
manipulation of citizens and their thinking through unfettered flows of
information, the private sector has established a "smoke screen" that in
effect enables subtle, yet significant, manipulation of citizens through
9. See Spiros Simitis, From the Market to the Polis: The EU Directive on the Protection
of Personal Data, 80 Iowa L Rev. 445 (1995). The proposed directive calls for restrictions of
data flows to nonmember countries that lack a suffident level of data protection.
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hidden control of personal information.
Part IV addresses the irony that European pressure should force the
United States to revisit the setting of standards for the private sector. This
section argues that this pressure should instigate a return to the basic goals
of American political values regarding the use and flow of information and
should result in more comprehensive, yet flexible, legal rules. This Part
concludes with a theory for global data flows on the basis of the use of
decentralized U.S. standards despite differing national legal rules and
European scrutiny.
I. THE ZEALOUS ADHERENCE TO THE PuRsUIT OF TARGETED STANDARDS
Despite the growth of the Information Society, the United States has
resisted all calls for omnibus or comprehensive legal rules for fair
information practice in the private sector. Legal rules have developed on
an ad hoc, targeted basis," while industry has elaborated voluntary norms
and practices for particular problems.2 Over the years, there has been an
almost zealous adherence to this ideal of narrowly targeted standards. In
other countries, the response to the Information Age has been quite
different. Foreign nations have enacted broad, sweeping "data protection"
laws to establish fair information practices in both public and private
sectors.3
In democratic society, information standards reflect specific
conceptions of governance. 4 An individual's desire for seclusion from the
public realm opposes the societal value in a free flow of information for
economic or political gain. Legal rules for the treatment of information set
10. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1974), repinted in 1974
U.S.C.CA.N. 6916, 6929, 6932-34 (explaining the decision not to extend the Privacy Act of
1974 to cover the private sector); Robert M. Gelman, Fragmented, Incomplete, and
Discontinuous: The Failure of Federal Privacy Regulatory Proposals and Institutions, 6
Software LJ. 199 (1993); Arthur R. Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The
Challenge of a New Technology in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 Mich. L Rev. 1089
(1969).
11. SeeJoel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in an Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier for
Individual Rights?, 44 Fed. Comm. LJ. 195 (1992).
12. See, e.g., Privacy Comm'n, supra note 8, at 34 ("In the private sector, the Commission
specifies voluntary compliance when the present need for the recommended change is not
acute enough to justify mandatory legislation .... ."); Direct Marketing Ass'n, Mail Preference
Service (describing a DMA program for consumers to have their names and addresses
suppressed from mailing lists for junk mail solicitations).
13. Se, eg., Private Registers Etc. Act, No. 293, 1978 (Den.), amended ly Act No. 383,
1987, translated in Danish Ministry of Justice, Pub. No. 622 (Oct. 2, 1987); Loi du 6 janvier
1978 relative I l'informatique, aux fichiers et aux libert6s (Fr.), ierinted in A.C.M. Nugter,
Transborder Flow of Personal Data Within the EC 353-63 (1990); Wet Persoonsregistraties,
1988 (Neth.) (Act of Dec. 27, 1988 providing rules for the protection of privacy in connection
with personal data files), reprinted in Nugter, supra, at 397; Data Protection Act, 1984 (U.K.),
replinted in Nugter, supra, at 365; see aio Data Protection Roundup, Privacy Laws & Bus., Oct.
1994, at 2-8 (summarizing the status of data protection legislation in 35 countries).
14. See Bennett, supra note 4, at 32.
[1995]
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boundaries for state intrusion into a citizen's life and for state control of a
citizen's conduct. For private interactions and the relationships between
citizens, both law and practice set the balance between dignity and free
flows of information. In American society, two powerful political values
have driven the pursuit of narrowly targeted standards: (1) the desire to
minimize restrictions on information flows and (2) the desire to disperse
standards setting.
A. The Desire to Minimize Restrictions on Information Flows
At its founding, the American democracy faced two broad ideological
commitments: one republican and the other (since termed) liberal. The
republican commitment emphasized self-government, while the liberal
commitment focused on individual rights. The Constitution of the United
States reflected a synthesis of these two commitments.'5 In the course of
its development, American politics enshrined a belief in limited
government distinct from foreign models of democracy. While both state
and national governments intervened in the economy from the birth of the
republic, American political thought has consistently had a strong
antistatist element Even as the role of government in society through
regulation of social welfare increased during both the Progressive Era and
the New Deal Era, American political philosophy still reflected a substantial
degree of hostility toward the regulation of private relations. 6 Elsewhere,
namely in continental Europe, prevailing politics viewed the government
more benevolently. Professor Glendon has aptly observed that the
discourse of American politics is now cast in terms of "rights talk."' 7 This
rhetoric of rights emphasizes limitations on government power over the
citizen. While the emergence of an American welfare state during the
twentieth century may have signaled a greater role for government in the
marketplace, the idea that the government should not intervene in the
marketplace of ideas in the absence of compelling needs remains
dominant Rather than government action, private relationships or private
contracts, thus, become a principal source of regulation for information
flows.
1. The Constitutional Emphasis on Restraining Government
These liberal and republican influences commit the American
Constitution to insuring citizens access to government, while also
emphasizing the protection of citizens from government The principal
15. See Martin Flaherty, History "lite" in Modem American Constitutionalism, 95 Colum.
L Rev. 523 (1995).
16. See Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 180 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1423, 1426 (1982).
17. SeeMaryA. Glendon, Rights Talk The Impoverishment of Political Discourse 1-17, 47-
75 (1991).
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focus of the Constitution is the division of authority between the states and
the federal government and the allocation of power across the branches of
federal government1 At the federal level, the Constitution enumerates
government powers, and the Bill of Rights sets out due process
requirements, prohibits random searches and seizures, and guarantees
freedom of assembly and freedom of the press. 9 While no explicit
protection for fair information practices appears in the Federal
Constitution, the Supreme Court has found implicit constitutional
protection for privacy.20 The privacy cases establish the individual as the
"lone-bearer" of powerful rights of autonomy against the governmentl In
essence, the Supreme Court's "rights" jurisprudence, especially in the
privacy area, emphasizes protections of the citizen against the government,
rather than direct protection of citizens against each other.n The Court
has required that state action be present to apply constitutional
protections; private conduct is not sufficient. As Professor Tribe wrote:
"Nearly all of the Constitution's self-executing, and therefore judicially
enforceable, guarantees of individual rights shield individuals only from
government action. Accordingly, when litigants claim the protection of
such guarantees, courts must first determine whether it is indeed
government action-state or federal-that the litigants are challenging."2
Similarly, state constitutions focus on the role of the state government
with respect to citizens. While several state constitutions do contain explicit
rights to privacy, most restrain the government from intruding on citizens'
privacy, rather than protect citizens directly from each other. 4 The
California Constitution is the rare exception.25 Although the California
18. See id. at 4.
19. U.S. Const., amends. I, IV-V, XIV, § 1.
20. See, eg., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (stating that although "[t]he
Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy... the Court has recognized
that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist
under the Constitution") (citations omitted); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85
(1964) (stating that the right of privacy is created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees).
21. Professors Glendon and Sandel have criticized the right to privacy as evolving toward
an Individual's right to make choices free of government interference. Sew Glendon, supra
note 17, at 57 (arguing that privacy has been redefined as the right to make decisions without
governmental intrusion); MichaelJ. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion
and Homosexuality, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 521, 527-28 (1989). For a critique of this view, see
generally Linda McClain, Rights and Irresponsibility, 43 Duke UJ. 989 (1994).
22. SeeJed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 Harv. L Rev. 737 (1989) (arguing that
the privacy cases are about protecting citizens against the government's ability to dictate
choices that are fundamental to human individuality); Sandel, supra note 21, at 525 (arguing
that "old privacy" cases emphasize protection against state surveillance and "new privacy" cases
emphasize protection of individual decisions or autonomy against government restrictions on
particular forms of conduct).
23. Lawrence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 18-1, at 1688 (2d ed. 1988)
(footnotes omitted).
24. See, e.g., Ariz. Const. art. II, § 8; Ill. Const. art. I, § 6.
25. See Cal. Const. art. I, § 1.
[19951
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Privacy Clause affords restraints on individual action, in practice, Privacy
Clause cases emphasize protection against the state. 6
In developing the state and federal constitutional emphasis, the U.S.
Supreme Court eventually supported the growth of economic and social
regulation during, the Progressive and post-New Deal eras against
challenges of intrusive government. This constitutional acceptance
reflected an emerging belief in the use of law as an instrument for the
enhancement of personal freedom through social welfare ! ' The Supreme
Court, however, preserved scrutiny of regulation to assure that government
secured, rather than intruded upon, the participation of citizens in
society.29
The constitutional emphasis on protection against the government
formed the basis of a legal canon that enshrines free flows of information
and minimal restrictions on the treatment of information. As Justice
Brandeis once wrote, the First Amendment secures the "freedom to think
as you will and to speak as you think.""° To have this liberty of thought,
information must be freely available. The prevailing U.S. doctrine for the
treatment of personal information does not look to the positive use of
regulation to secure such freedom' To ensure information is freely
available, American courts have long been committed to the "marketplace
of ideas." 2 Under this canon, democracy functions best when ideas, no
matter how well founded or repugnant, vie openly for acceptance in
society. For political discourse, the free expression of ideas means that
government-imposed restrictions on information are disfavored. Beyond
the political realm, the Supreme Court extends, at least to some extent,
this principle of minimally restrained information flows to the communica-
26. SeeJ. Clark Kelso, California's Constitutional Right to Privacy, 19 Pepp. L. Rev. 327,
418 (1992) (discussing the impetus for the constitutional amendment that added the privacy
clause). While the political debate surrounding the amendment to the California Constitution
adding this right to privacy suggested that regulation of the private sector was one of the
objectives, the cases interpreting the provision generally have a nexus with state action. ERg.,
Porten v. University of San Francisco, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (involving
personal information disclosed to a state agency in connection with a student loan
application). The California Supreme Court recently held that the Privacy Clause applies to
purely private conduct. Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994).
27. See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding wage regulation
against constitutional attack).
28. See, eg., Occupational Health and Safety Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988 & Supp. V
1993). Congress intended OHSA health and safety regulations to foster citizens' ability to
work. Id. § 651.
29. See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
30. 'Whitney v. California, 274 US. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
31. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 197-257 (1993) (arguing that, although
prevailing constitutional interpretations exalt wholly unregulated speech, government
intervention in the "marketplace of speech" can be understood as consistent with the
Constitution).
32. See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 113 S. Ct. 1806, 1808 (1993); Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
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tion of ideas unrelated to political discourse-- "commercial speech."33
2. The "Right to Privacy" Between Citizens
For the treatment of personal information between citizens, "the right
to privacy" first emerged as a narrow tort claim against yellow journalism.
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis launched the tort based on "the right
to privacy" in a law review article that sought to justify restricting the
behavior of the tabloid press in Boston.M In the ensuing century, the
common-law tort developed four distinct branches: (1) the misappropria-
tion of name or likeness for commercial purposes, (2) the public
disclosure of private facts, (3) intrusion upon seclusion, and (4) false light
publicity.5
Scholars have debated theories of privacy ever since Warren and
Brandeis immortalized the phrase "the right to be let alone."m Each
branch of the common-law tort, however, focuses precisely on narrow
restraints of private conduct and minimizes restrictions on information
flows."
The misappropriation tort is a right only against the unauthorized use
of a person's name or likeness for commercial purposes.s s The tort seeks
to protect the commercial value of an individual's identity.9 This original
purpose of this action emphasized protection from unauthorized
33. Irginia State Bd. of Phannacy, 425 U.S. at 770-73.
34. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L Rev. 193
(1890).
35. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652 (1977) (categorizing the various privacy tort
actions); William Prosser, The Right to Privacy, 48 Cal. L Rev. 383, 389 (1960) (arguing that
"the law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasions of four different interests of the
plaintiff"). The false light branch of the privacy tort is similar to defamation. However, unlike
actions for defamation, the false light privacy tort does not seek to protect an individual's
reputation and is not predicated on malice.
36. Although the phrase "the right to be let alone" is often attributed to Warren and
Brandeis, they were actually quoting the leading torts treatise of the day. Cooley on Torts.
Scholarly debate on privacy theories has flourished. S, ag., Edward Bloustein, Privacy as an
Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962, 963 (1964);
Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 Yale UJ. 475, 475 (1975); Jack Hirshleifer, Privacy. Its Origin,
Function, and Future, 9J. Legal Stud. 649, 649 (1980); Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and
Brandeis: Privacy, Property and Appropriation, 41 Case W. Res. L Rev. 647, 647 (1991)
[hereinafter Post, Rereading]; Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy. Community
and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 957 (1989); Westin, supra note 5, at 346-
49.
37. Professor Glendon argued that the Warren and Brandeis formulation of the right to
privacy is consistent with the John Stuart Mill tradition of protecting individuals. Glendon,
supra note 17, at 54.
38. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C (1977) (describing the tort of appropria-
tion of name or likeness).
39. Se; eg., Goodyear Tire &- Rubber Co. v. Vandergriff, 184 S.E. 452, 454 (Ga. 1936)
(discussing Georgia's codification of the tort); Freihofer v. Hearst Corp., 480 N.E.2d 349, 353
(N.Y. 1985) (interpreting the tort's codification by NewYork State); Bartholomew v. Workman,
169 P.2d 1012, 1014 (Okla. 1946) (discussing the tort at common law).
[1995]
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endorsements in advertisements and unauthorized commercial uses of
photographs of individuals. ° Individuals have a right to the commercial
value in their name and image. As such, the tort imposes only narrow
restrictions on the circulation of names and images.
The action for public disclosure of private facts limits the circulation
to the general public of information that is shockingly offensive and not
otherwise publicly available.4 ' The protection is designed to prevent the
wide dissemination of embarrassing facts42 and, thus, imposes a specific
narrow restraint on information flows.
The tort of intrusion upon seclusion focuses on the gathering of
information rather than on the circulation of that information. This tort
protects individuals from highly offensive methods of gathering
information in private areas;4 the action only sanctions conduct that
offends the sensibilities. As such, this tort too has a limited scope in the
scheme of restraints on information flows.
Finally, the tort protecting individuals against publicity that places a
person in a false light only offers protection against the wide dissemination
of information that is misleading or erroneous. The tort relaxes the
scienter requirements of actions for defamation, yet still preserves a narrow
scope.
In isolation, each of these torts does not provide broad restriction on
the circulation and treatment of personal information.4 Together,
however, they do suggest a somewhat more active role of law in regulating
conduct between citizens in comparison to the traditional constitutional
preferences regulating conduct between the state and its citizens. The
combination of narrow rights still does not offer more than a small set of
targeted restrictions on information flows.4
This philosophical antigovernment sentiment and doctrinal restraint
on government continues to translate into specific hostility for
comprehensive rules on the treatment of personal information. Self-
40. See Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
41. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977) (describing the tort of public
disclosure of private information).
42. Wide dissemination may not be necessary if sufficient embarrassment would occur
within the individual's local community. See Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900 (IlL 1990)
(holding that disclosure by employer of employee's mastectomy to several co-workers satisfied
the requirement for public disclosure of the private fact).
43. See Ault v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 860 F.2d 877, 882 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting claim
of intrusion because the plaintiff agreed to be photographed), cert denied, 489 U.S. 1080
(1989).
44. See, e.g., Polin v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 768 F.2d 1204 (10th Cir. 1985) (denying
claim for false light intrusion where the plaintiff's credit report was disseminated to 17
people); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E (1977) (describing actionable false light
publicity).
45. See Reidenberg, supra note 11, at 221-27 (discussing tort actions for dissemination of
personal information).
46. Seeid. at 234.
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regulation, or the voluntary adherence to fair practices, by the private
sector is the preferred mechanism to assure fair treatment of personal
information in American society. Following the principle of free flow of
information, legislatures respond only to specific issues;47 legal rules, if
any, are justified only when they narrowly target particular problems. These
legal rules tend to develop as an ad hoc response to public scandal.
Consequently, such rules are sectoral in nature.
3. The Underlying Purposes for Minimal Restrictions on Info7mation
The adherence to free flows of information and the corresponding
preference for targeted standards of fair information practice pursue two
underlying objectives: the avoidance of a manipulated citizenry and the
prevention of the abuse of power. Because information is power in the
Information Society, the control of information empowers the manipula-
tion of citizens. In contrast, unfettered information flows enhance citizens'
capacity to make free and informed decisions. If information is available
and citizens have fair access, then information may not be censored or
structured by the government to control citizen thinking or decision
making.49
Privacy torts suggest a similar concern about deceptive information. As
a right, privacy torts may offer rules of civility reflecting community
judgments.' The justification for minimizing tort restrictions on
information flows and allowing only targeted rules for the treatment of
personal information is to prevent thought control. Targeted legal rules
47. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 US.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1988); Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520, 2701-2709 (1988 & Supp. V 1993),
amended by Pub. L No. 103-414, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 4279; Video Privacy Protection
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710-2711 (1988); Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551(a)
(1988); see also Privacy Comm'n, supra note 8, at 34 ("In the private sector, the Commission
specifies voluntary compliance when the present need for the recommended change is not
acute enough to justify mandatory legislation."); Gellman, supra note 10, at 203-08
(explaining the weak results of legislative attempts to codify standards of fair information
practices); Reidenberg, supra note 11, at 220-29 (arguing that state legislation is narrowly
focused). In the public sector, legislatures have sought broader regulation. See, eg., PrivacyAct
of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988); California Information Practices Act of 1977, Cal. Civ. Code
§§ 1798-1798.78 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995); New York Personal Privacy Protection Law, N.Y.
Pub. Off. §§ 91-99 (Mcxinney 1988 & Supp. 1995); Wisconsin Personal Information Practices
Act, Wis.. Stat. §§ 19.35-19.36, 19.62-19.80 (1993-94); see also Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and
Participation: Personal Information and Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80
Iowa L. Rev. 553 (1995) (criticizing public sector information practices).
48. The Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, for example, responded to public outrage
when the video rental records of a nominee to the Supreme Court were publicized. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2710 (1988). likewise, the Fair Credit Reporting Act responded to consumer horror stories
of dealings with credit reporting agencies. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a-1681t (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
49. Implicit in fair access to information is the assumption that transaction costs related
to the circulation of information will be either trivial or of equal significance to all citizens.
This is not the case. See infra text accompanying notes 196-98.
50. See Post, Rereading, supra note 36, at 651-52.
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showing the community ethos reflect attempts to restrain manipulations of
citizens. The minimalist restraint on misappropriation of personal
information and the narrow "false light" protection strive to harness the
circulation of deceptive information that may manipulate citizens'
perceptions of each other.5 '
Scrutiny of government actions and targeted standards for fair
information practices assuage the public fear of the abuse of power.
Restraints reserve to citizens the power to control information flows against
government manipulation. Even beyond the issue of government rule
making, the fear of concentrations of information and "Big Brother" led to
protections against government surveillance and public sector information
processing activities.5 2 Constraints protect citizens against intrusions on
personal privacy by the powerful institutions of government.
The goal of preventing abuse of power is also at the heart of the
privacy torts. Warren and Brandeis sought to rein in what they perceived to
be an abuse of journalistic power. Unlike typical torts based on fault, the
resulting "privacy" torts emphasize rights based on prohibitions. 3 The
"rights" approach rather than "fault" approach blurs the historical division
between public and private law.r4 The "rights" orientation supports the
political significance of information standards as protection against abuses
of power. Privacy rights become part of the rhetoric of coercive power akin
to government power. As a right, the torts empower citizens to block
specific manipulative actions or abuses by others. The torts reserve to
citizens the ability to prevent private power from intruding on personal
privacy and to secure against the misappropriation of personal
information.
B. The Dispersion of Standards of Fair Information Practice
As a corollary to minimal state regulation of information flows, the
American system values a dispersion of standards for fair information
practice. There are no universal rules and there is no discrete source, such
51. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33 (American legal policy has supported free
information to promote free thinking).
52. See, eg., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988) (structuring federal government
information practices); Right to Financial Privacy, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1988 & Supp. V
1993) (protecting citizens from government access to bank account records); Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521, 2701-2711 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)
(protecting the confidentiality of communications from the government); David Flaherty,
Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies 321, 367-70 (1989) (arguing that U.S. protection
against government surveillance is inadequate); Paul M. Schwartz, Data Processing and
Government Administration: The Failure of the American Response to the Computer, 43
Hastings L.J. 1321 (1992) (arguing that protections are inadequate, particularly in light of
social welfare program).
53. See David W. Leebron, The Right to Privacy's Place in the Intellectual History of Tort
Law, 41 Case W. Res. L Rev. 769 (1991).
54. See generally Horwitz, supra note 16 (noting that American legal thought generally
sought to distinguish tort issues from constitutional or public law issues).
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as one sectoral rule or one industry norm or practice, to provide all the
standards for a particular context. Fair treatment of personal information
relies on the aggregation of standards from various sources. This diversity
promotes the goal that no single actor, whether it be the government
through its power to make legal rules or a private firm through market
power and contractual relationships, should control information flows.
In theory, the decentralization of fair information practice standards
through legal rules, industry norms, and business practice offers flexibility
to tailor the standards for specific conditions. The different forms of
standards coupled with the variety of standard makers-namely
government, industry groups, and individual companies--can target
problem issues. This theory draws on the same thinking as the federalist
goal of making the states "laboratories" for appropriate kinds of
regulation.5 Within this paradigm, standards for information practices
may arise at the federal, state, and even private sector level to best meet
particular issues.
As a matter of legal policy, the decentralization of standards implies
that fair treatment of personal information will emerge from overlapping
and substitutable sources. Legal rules may overlap business practice, and
either set of standards may substitute for the other type of standard. For
example, either legal rights or the technical characteristics of an
information system may achieve the result of fair treatment of personal
information.6 Decentralization also means that the mechanism to achieve
fair information practices is secondary to the actual results. This policy is
justified only if the combination of varied sources of standards provides a
full set of fair information practices.
In specific cases, the actual contours of fair information practice
evolve from two sources: (1) legal rules and (2) industry norms and
business practice. Each source has different characteristics and values. Only
the combination of treatment under the standards from each of these
sources can completely develop fair information practices in the private
sector.
1. Legal Rules
The most powerful standards for the treatment of personal
information are established through direct legislation. Specific laws, such
as the Fair Credit Reporting Ac 7 or the Video Privacy Protection Act,-
55. This famous description of the goals for federalism comes from a Brandeis dissent in
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932). For purposes of fair information
practices regulation, only the basic concept is significant for U.S. standards setting in the
private sector. The actual nuances and evolution of federalism are beyond the scope of this
Article.
56. See generally Joel R. Reidenberg, Rules of the Road for Global Electronic Highways:
Merging the Trade and Technical Paradigms, 6 Harv. J.Lh & Tech. 287 (1993).
57. 15 U.S.C §§ 1681-1681t (1988).
58. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710-2711 (1988).
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set targeted rules for the treatment of information. Other legal doctrines
may also indirectly have an impact on the treatment of personal
information and, thus, establish additional legal rules. For example, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Acteg establishes, to some degree,
standards for the treatment of data pertaining to racial or ethnic origin.
Similarly, tort rules such as defamation can have a dramatic impact on
business treatment of personnel records. Employers' fear of liability
constrains the retention and dissemination of personal information
relating to employees.
2. Industry Norms and Business Practice
Business and management decisions set standards. While commercial
policies are the driving force behind the existence or lack of existence of
business practices,6° several different forces mold business treatment of
personal information. Standards may emerge from: (a) the technical
network structure, (b) industry codes of conduct, (c) company policies, (d)
contractual arrangements, and (e) pressures for good corporate
citizenship. Because business decisions are flexible and can easily change,
the establishment of standards through business practice depends upon
the extent to which such standards are actually implemented by specific
companies. In any specific situation, however, the effectiveness of business
practice to achieve fair information practice will depend upon the
harmonization of commercial interests with individual interests.
a. Technical network structure
Technology itself may structure the treatment of personal
information. Technical decisions such as the frequency of data purges, or
back-up storage, "hard wires" rules for the treatment of personal
information directly in the network An information network may gather
and store significant amounts of personal information and make the
information accessible to anyone with network privileges, or the computer
system may keep only limited information and restrict access to certain
authorized corporate officers. These choices in network structure and
technology embed default rules or practices into the architecture of an
information network.61 Although technology can be modified, these
business practices do provide a robust means of establishing standards for
fair information practice.
59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
60. See geerally H. Jeff Smith, Managing Privacy. Information Technology and Corporate
America 85-86 (1994) (noting that short-term profit incentives impede corporate information
privacy policy making).
61. See Reidenberg, supra note 56, at 296-301.
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b. Industry codes of conduct
Industry codes of conduct set voluntary benchmarks for companies.62
At best, they establish an ethos for an industrial sector. The actual
treatment of personal information by companies in the industry is not
reflected by the existence or nonexistence of a sectoral code. To the extent
that a code reflects customary industry practice, it may have an important
influence on specific companies. However, an industry code itself is a weak
source for standards because such codes are voluntary and lack
enforcement; the only true site of self-regulation remains at the level of
company activity.
c. Company policies
Actual company policies and their specific implementation offer
important standards of fair information practices. s Company policies
designed for a variety of purposes are relevant sources for fair information
practices. If the implementation of a company data security policy means
that strict limits are placed upon access to personal information, the result
is an important standard for fair information practices with respect to that
company. Nonetheless, company policies and their implementation offer
"soft" standards; they are neither legally binding nor industry-wide.
d. Contractual arrangements
Contractual arrangements may arise from two sets of relationships.
Companies may contract directly with individuals and may stipulate in such
a contract how an individual's personal information will be treated.
Companies may also contract with business customers and similarly provide
for the treatment of personal information by the business customer. In this
case, protection of an individual's personal information is an incident of
the contract between the company and its business customer. Each set of
arrangements may establish legally binding standards because of the
enforceability of contracts."
62. See eg., Direct Marketing Ass'n, Guidelines for Personal Information Protection
[hereinafter DMA Guidelines]; Information Industry Ass'n, Fair Information Practices
Guidelines (1994).
63. See, e.g., American Express, An Important Notice to Our Cardmembers Concerning
Cardmember Privacy, Mailing and Telemarketing Options (1993); Citibank Mastercard & Visa,
Privacy Policy (1993).
64. In the case of contracts between businesses, the individuals protected by terms in the
agreement are third party beneficiaries. SeeJohn D. Calamari &Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of
Contracts 691-702 (3d ed. 1987). Because courts limit the enforcement rights of third party
beneficiaries, those individuals vill only be able to recover under specific circumstances. Id.
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e. Good corporate citizenship
Finally, pressures from public opinion, academia, advocacy groups,
and government officials may also set the tone for business practice. These
pressures place the good name and image of companies at risk if treatment
of personal information is unfair. To promote good corporate citizenship,
some companies have implemented new practices. Companies such as
Equifax and Dun & Bradstreet have recently even included commitments
to privacy in their annual reports 5 American Express now provides a
detailed privacy notice to cardholders on an annual basis.6 These
pressures and incentives form moderately strong standards because
companies expect some form of public sanction to result from poor
practices such as lost business, lost goodwill, or constraining government
regulation. Nevertheless, nothing about corporate citizenship pressures is
legally binding.
The dispersion of standards for fair information practice across legal
rules, and industry norms and business practices, reinforces narrowly
targeted treatment of personal information. Each type of standard takes a
particular perspective on fair information practice and addresses particular
contexts or characteristics of the treatment of personal information. Under
the U.S. scheme, no single standard seeks to cut across boundaries of law
and industry practice.
II. THE DISAPPOINTING AGGREGATION OF DISPERSED STANDARDS
The pursuit of targeted standards at a time of explosive growth in
wide-scale information processing activity makes the actual determination
of rights, responsibilities, and practices in American society complex. The
varied standards for fair information practice offer overlapping, yet
distinct, treatment of personal information. Only the combination of legal
rules, industry norms, and business practices can properly define the scope
of standards for the treatment of personal information in the private
sector.
The assessment of U.S. standards requires a comparison with a
benchmark for principles of fair information practice. A variety of
American, international, and foreign legal instruments have articulated
65. See Dun & Bradstreet Corp., Annual Report to Stockholders (1993), available in
LEXIS, COMPNY library, SECOL File; Equifax Inc., Annual Report to Stockholders (1992),
available in LEXIS, COMPNY Library, SECOL File; Equifax Inc., Annual Report to
Stockholders (1991) [hereinafter Equifax 1991 Report], availabl in LEXIS, COMPNY ibrary,
SECOL File.
66. The exact wording of this notice is contained in an assurance made by American
Express to the Bureau of Consumer Frauds and Protection of the New York Attorney
General's Office. See In re American Express Travel Related Servs., Inc., Agreement of
Voluntary Assurances (May 8, 1992) (on file with the University of Iowa College of Law
library).
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commonly accepted standards.67 These commonly accepted standards
provide a thorough set of criteria to evaluate the development of U.S.
standards. While the legal instruments approach standards for the
treatment of personal information comprehensively, the existence of a
comprehensive set of standards still comports with the ad hoc and targeted
U.S. approach. Standards themselves do not offend the value of minimal
restrictions on information flows. Standards are necessary for a fair
"marketplace" of personal information. Moreover, the entire set of
commonly accepted standards need not appear in any single U.S. source;
the collection of American standards from all U.S. sources can treat
personal information according to the commonly accepted standards.
The appropriate analytic method to assess American standards is to
focus on particular contexts for information processing. An accurate
general assessment is precluded by diverse needs for personal information
in the private sector and targeted standards from dispersed sources; the
multitude of practices and narrow standards def, universally applicable
conclusions. The measure of fair treatment of personal information, thus,
becomes the extent to which the benchmark principles are satisfied in
particular contexts through the aggregation of the dispersed standards. For
the analysis to be meaningful, the contexts must be drawn from key
industrial sectors that represent major information processing activities
with a significant impact on society.
A. The Benchmark: Commonly Accepted Standards
In the United States and abroad, there is a consensus on the general
principles necessary for the fair treatment of personal information in the
private sector. The U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare
wrote one of the first sets of guidelines for the treatment of personal
information."8  The U.S. government supported similar voluntary
guidelines adopted several years later by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). 9 Many major American
companies publicly declared their acceptance and support of these OEGD
principles.70 These core principles are also embodied in a number of U.S.
laws. Elsewherd in North America, Qu6bec has adopted legislation
67. See infra text accompanying notes 68-78.
68. See Flaherty, supra note 52, at 306; Privacy Comm'n, supra note 8, at 15 n.7.
69. See Recommendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection
of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, OECD Doc. (0 58 final) (Oct. 1, 1980),
repinted in 20 I.L.M. 422 (1981) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines]. The U.S. government
participated in the negotiations. See ahso Joel R. Reidenberg, The Privacy Obstade Course:
Hurdling Barriers to Transnational Financial Services, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S137, S167 (1992)
(comparing the OECD Guidelines with the European Convention).
70. See General Accounting Office, Privacy Policy Activities of the National Telecommuni-
cations and Information Administration (Aug. 31, 1984), cited in Gellman, supra note 10, at
227 n.60; U.S. Council for Int'l Business, List of U.S. Corporations Supporting the OECD
Privacy Guidelines (1983).
71. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988) (establishing core principles for
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recently mandating comparable basic principles.72 Across the Atlantic, the
European treaty on data protection 7 contains a set of basic principles
similar to the OECD Guidelines.74 Although the United States is not a
party to the treaty, the treaty mandates the enactment in signatory
countries of laws containing the core principles. More recently, the
European Union's proposed directive on data protection models its
standards for the fair treatment of personal information around the same
set of basic principles that exist in various European national laws.!-
Likewise, in Asia, data protection policies look to the basic principles
found in the OEGD Guidelines and European treaty.
76
The basic principles of this global consensus form four sets of
standards: (1) standards for data quality, (2) standards for transparency or
openness of processing, (3) standards for the treatment of particularly
sensitive information, and (4) standards for the enforcement of fair
information practices.77 While the precise requirements and interpreta-
tions for data quality, transparency, sensitive information, and enforcement
vary, 5 the core elements are commonly accepted by the global
community.
the public sector); Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988) (establishing core
principles for video records); Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551
(1988) (establishing core principles for the cable communications sector).
72. See An Act respecting the protection of personal information in the private sector,
1993 S.Q. 503 (Can.) (to be codified at R.S.Q. ch. P-39.1).
73. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Eur. T.S. No. 108 (Jan. 28, 1981), reprinted in 20 1.LM.
317 [hereinafter European Convention].
74. SeeJon Bing, The Council of Europe Convention and the OECD Guidelines on Data
Protection, in Regulation of Transnational Communications, 1984 Mich. Y.B. Int'l Legal Stud.
271; P. Howard Patrick, Privacy Restrictions on Transnational Data Flows: A Comparison of
the Council of Europe Draft Convention and the OECD Guidelines, 21 Jurimetrics J. 405
(1981); Reidenberg, supra note 69, at S143-46.
75. See Proposal for a Council Directive on the Protection of Individuals in Relation to
the Processing of Personal Data, Eur. Comm. Doc. COM(90)314 final-SYN 287 (July 17, 1990)
[hereinafter Original Proposal]; Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Protection
of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of
Such Data, Eur. Comm. Doc. COM(92)422 final-SYN 287 (Oct. 15, 1992) [hereinafter
Amended Proposal]; Common Position Adopted by the Council with a View to Adopting
Directive on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (C 93) 1 [hereinafter Common Position];
Simitis, supra note 9.
76. See Reidenberg, supra note 69, at S151-52.
77. Some scholars have even argued that these norms form customary international law.
See Olga Estadella-Yuste, Transborder Data Flows and Sources of Public International Law, 16
N.C.J. Int'l & Comm. Reg. 379 (1991).
78. See generalty Reidenberg, supra note 69.
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1. Data Quality Standards
The benchmark of data quality consists of commonly accepted
standards to assure that personal information is acquired legitimately and
is used in a manner that treats fairly the interests of individuals, industry,
and society. These standards provide value to personal information. A key
commonly accepted standard requires that personal information only be
collected lawfully for specific purposes.! This basic standard imposes an
obligation on data collectors to determine the uses of each piece of
personal information prior to its collection and an obligation to obtain
such information solely through lawful means. Another core element
stipulates that personal information be used by the collector only in a
manner compatible with the purpose for collection and that unrestrained
secondary use is inappropriate. 0 This critical standard binds the
treatment of personal information to the uses for which the information
was collected.
The commonly accepted data quality standards also concur that
personal information musf be relevant for the purpose intended by the
collection of the information. This core element proscribes the collection
of extraneous personal information.8' While this principle of data quality
provides no clear guidance to determine whether particular information is
necessary for an identified collection purpose, the commonly accepted
standard imposes on collectors of personal information an obligation to
resist the desire to acquire as much information as possible.
The timeliness of information is also an important core element of
data quality standards. There is, thus, a commonly accepted standard that
collectors should not store personal information any longer than necessary
to accomplish the purposes for collection.n This is designed to assure the
validity of personal information in circulation.
Data quality further demands accuracy of personal information.
Commonly accepted standards assure this aspect by providing individuals
with access to their personal information and the ability to require
correction of inaccurate data.3 Finally, data quality also requires measures
to assure the integrity of personal information. There is a common
standard that security measures are necessary to protect personal
information against destruction or unauthorized alteration.'
79. See Common Position, supra note 75, art. 6(1)(b); European Convention, supra note
73, art. 5; OECD Guidelines, supra note 69, art 9.
80. See Common Position, supra note 75, art. 6(1)(b); European Convention, supra note
73, art. 5b; OECD Guidelines, supra note 69, arts. 9-10.
81. See Common Position, supra note 75, art. 6(1)(c); European Convention, supra note
73, art. 5c; OECD Guidelines, supra note 69, art. 8.
82. See Common Position, supra note 75, art. 6(e); European Convention, supra note 73,
art. 5e; OECD Guidelines, supra note 69, art. 8.
83. See Common Position, supra note 75, art. 12; European Convention, supra note 73,
art. 8c; OECD Guidelines, supra note 69, arts. 12-13.
84. See Common Position, supra note 75, art. 17; European Convention, supra note 73,
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2. Standards for Transparency of Information Processing
The benchmark of transparency consists of commonly accepted
standards that assure the openness of information processing.s" Global
consensus dictates that the circulation of personal information be open to
scrutiny by individuals and not obscured from view.
The core elements for the transparency of information processing
assure the participation of individuals in the treatment of their personal
information. The first commonly accepted standard is that the very
existence of information processing activities must be transparent to
citizens.8 The core standard requires that collectors of personal
information give individuals notice for the collection of personal
information. In some cases, the commonly accepted transparency standards
go further and require that collectors obtain the affirmative consent from
individuals for certain processing and use of personal information.0
3. Special Protection for Sensitive Data
For information practices to be fair, benchmark standards recognize
that certain personal information is inherently more sensitive than other
data. A commonly accepted standard establishes that the treatment of
sensitive information warrants greater scrutiny and protection."
Specifically, data pertaining to characteristics such as race, religion, health,
or political beliefs must be accorded a higher level of protection.
4. Enforcement of Fair Information Practices
The benchmark of enforceability includes commonly accepted
standards to assure the implementation of fair information practices.89
The core elements of this consensus on enforceability has two components.
First, there must be supervision and oversight of the treatment of personal
information. Second, there must be a remedy for aggrieved individuals.O
art 7; OECD Guidelines, supra note 69, art. 11; see also Office of Technology Assessment, U.S.
Congress, Information Security and Privacy in Network Environments (1994) (discussing the
critical importance of security for network information).
85. This use of the term "transparency" comes from the trade meaning rather than
certain business meanings that refer to hidden, back-office activities. In the trade sense,
transparency means that rules, regulations, and practices should be open to scrutiny. Certain
business usages of "transparency" mean that intermediary business functions are hidden from
customers.
86. See Common Position, supra note 75, arts. 7(a), 10(1), 11(1); European Convention,
supra note 73, art. 8a; OECD Guidelines, supra note 69, art 1Sa.
87. See Common Position, supra note 75, art 7(a); European Convention, supra note 73,
art. 5b; OECD Guidelines, supra note 69, arts. 9-10.
88. See Common Position, supra note 75, art. 8; European Convention, supra note 73, art.
6; OECD Guidelines, supra note 69, art 3(a).
89. See Common Position, supra note 75, arts. 28, 30; European Convention, supra note
73, art. 13; OECD Guidelines, supra note 69, art. 19.
90. From a U.S. perspective, the acceptance of private remedies as a commonly accepted
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The common acceptance of these two core standards provides significant
strength to the benchmarks.
B. The Search for Benchmark Standards in Key Contexts
The multitude of data processing situations, the targeted nature of
U.S. standards, and the multilayered regulatory framework in the United
States necessitate a context-specific methodology to analyze the
implementation of benchmark standards.9' Narrowly targeted standards
can only make sense against the badcdrop of their intended applications.
For the analysis to be meaningful, the identification and selection of
information processing contexts must be appropriate. The contexts should
reflect key industries or sectors in American life that have a. significant
impact on society. While many activities satisfy this criteria, two major areas
dearly qualify: direct marketing and employment. Within each of these
areas, the treatment of personal information is diversified in all senses. The
provision of information is diversified, the providers of information are
diversified, and the uses of information are diversified. The complexity of
contextual analysis calls for even greater selectivity. Narrower contexts
within each area should reflect representative treatment of personal
information within the industry or sector. For example, in the employment
field, the treatment of personnel records by employers represents a critical
information processing context. The treatment of personal information in
personnel records is vital to labor markets and has a significant impact on
employees and society. By careful selection of contexts, the analysis and
comparison of U.S. standards against the commonly accepted benchmark
standards offers a concrete assessment of key fair information practices in
the U.S. private sector.
1. Direct Marketing
The direct marketing industry has become a major force in the
American economy."' In offering valuable shopping services to consumers,
direct marketing relies on the gathering of massive quantities of personal
information. Fair information practices for direct marketing focus on how
particular individuals are identified for solicitations and how names are
exchanged among collectors of personal information. The receipt of
unwanted commercial solicitations may be a nuisance, but junk mail and
junk calls are not in themselves an issue of fair information practice.
standard is not entirely dear. At the international level, the United States has often objected
to mandatory rules that have private remedies. Yet, where U.S. legal rules provide for
standards of fair information practice, private remedies are included.
91. See Reidenberg, supra note 56, at 296 (arguing that general principles seeking to
balance free flows of information with human rights will necessarily require contextual
interpretations).
92. The direct marketing industry as a whole claims to contribute $350 billion to the
gross national product. Larry Jaffee, Catalog Revenue in 1992 Reached $51.5 billion: WEFA
Group Study, DM News, July 5, 1993, at 4.
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One of the most important contexts for the treatment of personal
information in direct marketing is the profiling of information.93 By cross-
referencing numerous items of personal information, individual profiles
are developed. These profiles may consist of a single characteristic, such as
subscribers to Penthouse or denture adhesive buyers.95 They may also
consist of a more complete set of characteristics such as married, middle-
aged, "large size" women with children and moderate incomes who
purchase particular types of underwear.9 6 A list of individuals who meet
specified characteristics conveys far more than innocuous name and
address data and implicates the benchmark standards for the treatment of
personal information.
This industry obtains discrete bits of personal information from many
sources. Interactive communications now leave significant amounts of
personal information behind, such as the details of an individual's use of
identifiable network services. Transaction data, typically derived from calls
to toll- free numbers and mail order purchases, offer a wealth of
information about individuals.97 For example, calls to a touch tone health
information center generate data on the phone subscriber and. on that
household's interest in particular diseases or health products. Subscription
lists from publications and purchasing patterns at stores all leave similar
traces of individual behavior.98 Public records also provide personal
information to this industry. Property records, for example, indicate the
value or purchase price of an individual's home as well as any outstanding
mortgage amounts.
Direct marketers' treatment of personal information for profiling
demonstrates a surprising absence of many benchmark standards. In
contrast to other U.S. industries, no identifiable sectoral law targets direct
marketing.W Sectoral laws in other fields, such as home entertainment,
93. Profiling must be distinguished from the commercialization of personal information
in the form of list sales or rentals. The exercise of fair information practices to create the
profile does not imply that fair practices are employed to commercialize the personal
information. The opposite is also true. High standards for the commercialization of lists do
not necessarily reflect on the standards implemented for the creation of the underlying
profiles.
94. See General Media Handles Newly Merged Database, DM News, Dec. 5, 1994, at 31
(including the list of Penthouse subscribers).
95. See LH Management Advertisement, DM News, June 20, 1994, at 33; Sea-Bond
Denture Names Requestors, DM News, Mar. 27, 1995, at 52.
96. SeeVenture Communications Advertisement, DM News, Dec. 26, 1994, at 27.
97. SeeJonathan Berry et al., Database Marketing- A Potent New Tool for Selling, Bus.
Wk., Sept. 5, 1994, at 56, 56-62.
98. Catalogs containing thousands of such lists are already in existence. See Standard Rate
& Data Serv., The Bullet: Direct Mail List Rates and Data, Sept. 1993.
99. Both LEXIS and Westlaw have searchable files containing such information.
100. Legislation limiting junk phone calls is not designed as a fair information practices
law. See Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (Supp. IV 1992). Only
provisions related to the maintenance of "do not call" databases impact on the treatment of
personal information.
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address some marketing uses of personal information.' Thus, industry
norms and business practices largely set the standards for the treatment of
personal information in this sector. The industry trade association, the
Direct Marketing Association (DMA), has developed a code of conduc 2
and has a Privacy Task Force to promote voluntary, self-regulatory
standards within the sector. s In fact, the DMA has engaged in a major
effort to promote the implementation of information practice stan-
dards. 04  Nevertheless, company practices for profiling remain the
principal source of actual standards.
a. Profiling and data quality standards
Compared to the benchmark of commonly accepted standards for
data quality, direct marketing standards in connection with profiling are
disappointing. The legal rules are exceedingly sparse. 05  Profiles
themselves are only rarely subject to legal restraints for collection
purposes,'" and virtually no legal rules restrict secondary use of
information for profiling, the collection of unnecessary information, or the
duration of storage. Because of public outrage to particular abuses, rare
exceptions are found in the home entertainment and credit reporting
fields.'0 7
Technical arrangements for the computer systems that process direct
marketing profiles do not routinely provide standards for the core
elements of the data quality benchmark. For example, the information
system at Metromail, one of the nation's largest list brokers, is not even
configured to accommodate requests for access to personal information
101. See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b) (2) (1988) (video records); 47 U.S.C. § 551(c) (2) (C) (1988)
(cable communications records).
102. DMA Guidelines, supra note 62.
103. Recently, the Direct Marketing Association released a Fair Information Practices
Manual to elaborate standards for the treatment of personal information. Direct Marketing
Ass'n, Fair Information Practices Manual (1994) [hereinafter DMA Manual].
104. Id.
105. Only a few laws limit marketing uses of personal information gathered from specific
sources. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988) (providing that video stores may keep personal
information to fulfill the purpose of collection); 47 U.S.C. § 551(a)(1) (1988) (providing that
cable company may collect personal information from subscribers only if it specifies the
reason and informs subscribers). Other key sources of profile information, such as telephone
and purchase transaction records, are unrestricted. Another prime source, state driver's
license records, however, soon will be subject to restrictions. See Omnibus Crime Act of 1994,
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2515 (1994). California Senator Barbara Borer's amendment to the crime
bill (Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (108
Stat.) 2099-2102, to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725) required that state departments of
motor vehicles offer drivers the ability to opt out of the now public disclosures of data such as
height, weight, hair color, eye color, and corrected vision. Imposition of the restrictions were
motivated by a stalking case in California in which a murderer found the victim by accessing
state motor vehicle records.
106. See Mass. Gen. L. ch. 1751 (1992).
107. See Reidenberg, supra note 11, at 219-20, 234-36.
(1995]
HeinOnline  -- 80 Iowa L. Rev. 518 1994-95
SETTING STANDARDS
profiles.08 Even having protections against the misuse of profiles through
seeding lists' 9 does not deal with underlying secondary use of informa-
tion in the creation of the profile.
To some extent, technical structures do address other aspects of the
data quality benchmark. System planning can limit the duration for which
companies store personal information for profiling. While the capacity for
retaining massive volumes of information has increased, and the associated
costs have decreased, capacity and cost are not unlimited for most
companies. n ° Consequently, companies will schedule data purging for
their systems. Similarly, security choices are often built into profiling
systems; computer system access is likely to be restricted.
In terms of industry norms, the trade association guidelines attempt to
set out standards for data quality. The guidelines state that "[p]ersonal
data should be collected by fair and lawful means for a direct marketing
purpose" and should only be used for marketing purposes."' However,
little credence can be given to this pronouncement. The trade association
itself opposes limitations on secondary use, 1 2 and the broadness of the
purpose specification frustrates any meaningful standard. All personal
information can be used for a marketing purpose.
As for business practice, companies are often not very responsible in
setting data quality standards. For example, Fingerhut, a large catalog
marketing company, has a privacy policy that says any relevant "informa-
tion will be used and maintained for marketing purposes." s Fingerhut's
policy does not require the company's managers to articulate any specific
purpose for data collection.
Secondary use of personal information for profiling is widespread in
the direct marketing sector. A review of any list catalog, such as the
Standard Rate & Data Services catalog, or the trade paper DM News,
demonstrates the extent of secondary uses. Profiles of political
conservatives,1 4 liberals," 5 women who buy wigs, 116 impotent middle-aged men,117 gamblers, 18 male buyers of fashion underwear,"9 and
108. Telephone interview with Mary E. Doher, Metromail (July 26, 1994), confirmed in
Letter fromJoel K. Reidenberg to Mary E. Doher (Aug. 16, 1994) (on file with the University
of Iowa College of Law library).
109. This is a process whereby decoy names are used to determine if a profile is being
used in accordance with the list rental or sale agreement.
110. Seejohn Verity, Silicon and Software that Mine for Gold, Bus. Wk., Sept. 5, 1994, at
62.
111. DMA Guidelines, supra note 62, arts. 1, 5.
112. Se e.g., Direct Marketing Ass'n, Grassroots Advocacy Guide for Direct Marketers 50
(1993) (suggesting ways for direct marketers to oppose legislative proposals that would
prohibit secondary uses of credit information for marketing purposes).
113. Fingerhut Companies, Inc., Consumer Privacy Guidelines, art. 1.
114. See Conservative Business File Names Community Leaders, DM News, May 23, 1994, at
44.
115. SeeAmerican List Counsel, Inc. Advertisement, DM News, Dec. 26, 1994, at 11.
116. RMI Direct Marketing, Inc. Advertisement, DM News, Mar. 20, 1995, at 17.
117. SeeJust Lists Offers "Male Potency" File, DM News, Apr. 19, 1993, at 37.
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buyers of "skimpy swimwear and related items such as clingy short dresses
and skirts," 12 are just a few examples of the profiles being developed.
Similarly, companies do not seem to pay attention to the other
benchmarks of data quality. The relevance standard poses problems for the
direct marketing industry. Any information can be included in some form
of profile at a later date, and companies, such as Reader's Digest, even
collect information about nonresponses to solicitations. Major industry
players ignore the benchmarks offering individuals access to personal
information held by companies. For example, Metromail does not provide
access to personal information to the concerned individuals' 2' despite its
history of membership on the DMA Privacy Task Force, a group dedicated
to promoting fair information practices within the trade association, and
the company's purported adherence to the DMA Guidelines. Typical
responses from companies when faced with a request for access to profile
information is "it's proprietary" or "we won't tell you."
1 2
In contrast, there are instances when company policies include
practices covered by the core elements of data quality. This rare case
occurs most often for security. Direct marketing companies typically
include standards for security practices to protect their commercial
interests.
118. Dunhill Unveils Casino Gamblers, DM News, May 23, 1994, at 48; National List
Exchange Advertisement, id. at 40.
119. Brawn of California Offers Three Lists, DM News, Apr. 5, 1993, at 34.
120. Sunup Sundown Available from TC1 List Management, DM News, Dec. 20, 1993, at
27.
121. The DMA Guidelines call for access to personal information held by direct marketers.
DMA Guidelines, supra note 62, art. 5. Compare Letter from Mary E. Doher, Metromail, to Joel
R. Reidenberg (Aug. 10, 1994) tith Letter from Joel R. Reidenberg to Mary E. Doher (Aug.
16, 1994) (both on file with the University of Iowa College of Law library). Initially, Metromail
Ignored the follow-up request for adequate and accurate disclosure of the personal
Information. Subsequent to mention of this practice at the Annenberg Conference, Metromail
offered a dubious explanation. See Letter from Thomas E. Huller, Vice President, Metromail,
to Joel R. Reidenberg (Oct. 17, 1994) (explaining that Metromail sold public record
Information, but that Metromal did not provide the information on request to the individual
concerned in order to protect the person's privacy) (on file with the University of Iowa
College of Law library). Metromail provided a catalog of consumer lists, marked to show the
lists containing the requestor's personal information, as a full disclosure. Id. The catalog does
not include all the consumer lists that Metromail sells, however, and thus cannot be an
accurate response to the request for access.
122. See, ag., Letter from Susan Coe Heltsch, Vice President, First Card, to Joel .
Reidenberg (May 10, 1993) ("[M our name was obtained from one of the mailing lists which
we purchased. Both the source of this list and the credit criteria which qualified you... are
proprietary in nature, and for this reason, I am unwilling to disclose this information.") (on
file with the University of Iowa College of Law library).
123. For example, Fingerhut's policy notes that "[o]nly those employees needed to carry
out the business functions involved may have access to information about any... customer."
ingerhut, supra note 113, art. 4.
[1995]
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b. Profiling and transparency standards
Standards covering the transparency benchmark are similarly weak for
information profiling in the direct marketing industry. Legal rules are
virtually nonexistent.24 Technical arrangements do not deal with notice
or consent issues.
The DMA tried to address transparency by creating an industry-wide
"opt-out" program. ' 5 These mail and telephone preference services
offered by the DMA strive to suppress mail or telephone solicitations to
individuals who have requested not to receive junk mail and junk calls.
Because these programs operate after the profiling has taken place, they
are not standards for transparency of profiling. Rather they reflect
standards for transparency of list exchanges." In any event, the
programs are not yery successful; individuals are unaware of their
existence,"5 and corporate compliance cannot be measured.
In practice, companies frequently fail to provide meaningful notice of
information practices. Typical statements on consumer catalogs sent to
individuals use language like "[f]rom time to time, companies and
organizations ask to send their catalogs and brochures to our custom-
ers.... we allow it."" 8 Other companies, such as American Express, offer
"better disdosure.""5 Commonly, companies ask individuals to fill out
surveys with the promise of "free savings" or "valuable coupons." These
surveys rarely identify the survey organization, the beneficiary, or the
intended uses of responses."0 Metromail, in one recent example, even
affirmatively misled individuals as to the nature and purpose of its
information gathering.'5 ' In fairness, however, companies are increasingly
124. Only the laws governing cable communications and video privacy protection appear
to require any sort of notice for the collection and use of personal information. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2710 (1988); 47 U.S.C. § 551 (1988).
125. See Data Protection, Computers, and Changing Information Practices: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1990) (statement of Richard A.
Barton, Senior Vice President, Direct Marketing Ass'n); DMA Manual, supra note 103.
126. They offer notice that profiles will be sold to others and provide a means for
individuals to prevent such sales. The opt-out programs by their very nature do not address
notice for the profiling activities themselves.
127. MaryJ. Culnan, Consumer Attitudes Toward Secondary Information Use, Privacy, and
Name Removal: Implications for Direct Marketing, Paper presented at Symposium on
Consumer Privacy, Chicago/Midwest Direct Marketing Days (Jan. 20, 1993) (revised
manuscript on file with the University of Iowa College of Law library).
128. Fingerhut Corp., Catalog Payment Chart (on file with the University of Iowa College
of Law library,.
129. American Express discloses annually- "[W]e develop mailing lists based on
information you provided to us on your initial application and in surveys, information derived
from how you use the Card that may indicate purchasing preferences and lifestyle, as well as
information available from external sources." American Express, supra note 63.
130. See, e.g., Survey Savings Form (on file with the University of Iowa School of Law
library).
131. SeeR R Donnelley Unit Faces FTC Scrutiny over Phone Survey, Wall St J., Dec. 29,
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offering individuals the ability to opt out of future use of personal
information for marketing profiles.
c. Profiling and sensitive information
The commonly accepted benchmark standards for the treatment of
sensitive personal information are virtually nonexistent in the context of
profiling. Health information, for example, has few applicable legal
protections."5 2 Aside from rare state statutes limiting insurance informa-
tion and marketing profiles,"'s state tort law, in theory, imposes legal
rules for profiling sensitive information. The tort protecting against the
public disclosure of private facts ostensibly covers the treatment of sensitive
information. However, a basic element of the tort is the wide dissemination
of personal information.'34 This makes tort claims hard to sustain for
typical disclosures in the marketing context; the disclosures are often
between two companies. 5* Additionally, few technical protections in the
profiling systems would appear to offer special safeguards for sensitive
information."4
Industry norms and business practice similarly ignore standards for
sensitive data. For example, the DMA Guidelines do not even mention
sensitive data."7 In fact, the DMA Guidelines can even be read to
approve of weaker standards for sensitive information than for ordinary
personal information. The guidelines define personal data as
"[i]nformation which is linked to an individual.., and which is not
publicly available or observable"""' and, thus, exclude "public" informa-
tion from any protection. Since data such as race and physical handicaps
are readily observable, they would not qualify for the narrow protections of
1994, at CIO.
132. See The Fair Health Information Practices Act of 1994: Hearings on H.R. 4077 Before
the House Subcomm. on Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 358 (1994) (statement of Paul
Schwartz, Associate Professor, University of Arkansas-Fayetteville Law Center); Office of
Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Protecting Privacy in Computerized Medical
Information (1993); Robert M. Gellman, Prescribing Privacy. The Uncertain Role of Physician
in the Protection of Patient Privacy, 62 N.C. L Rev. 255 (1984) (arguing existing ethical and
legal standards inadequately aid physicians protecting patient confidentiality); Paul M.
Schwartz, The Protection of Privacy in Health Care Reform, 48 Vand. L Rev. 295 (1995).
133. See e.g., Mass. Gen. L ch. 1751 (1992) (regulating the collection of information for
insurance purposes).
134. See Polin v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 768 F.2d 1204, 1206-07 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding
that distribution to small group of recipients does not qualify for the tort).
135. Recently, courts have found, however, special protection for the disclosure of HIV
diagnoses. See Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. CL
Law Div. 1991); Award in HIV Disclosure, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1994, at A23 [hereinafter
Sullivan v. Delta Airlines).
136. See Berry et al., supra note 97, at 56-57, 60 (describing database marketing systems).
137. SeeDMA Guidelines, supra note 62.
138. Id. at 2.
1995]
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the DMA Guidelines.
Companies themselves seem to reject higher standards and treat
sensitive data as the key to valuable profiles. TRW, for example, sells ethnic
lists that can be segmented with detailed demographic information (e.g.,
age, income, and marital status).' Claritas offers a profiling product that
"makes it easy to keep up with the Joneses... as well as the Johnsons, the
Francos, the Garcias, the Wongs and all the others,"'4 and Metaxa found
its niche profiling Greeks who drink liquor. 4' Profiles of political
opinions and sexual orientation are also readily available. One company
boasts: "Gay men and lesbians .... we've got the lists .... [s] electable
by... zip, sex, gift amount [donors to gay causes] .... They're
yours."
142
Health information is similarly exempt from special consideration in
the context of profiling. Johnson &Johnson profiled 5 million incontinent,
elderly women and said the activity was "consistent with current direct
marketing industry practices." 43 Metromail, a one-time member of the
DMA Privacy Task Force, profiled millions of Americans with specific
health conditions (i.e., allergies, bleeding gums, and epilepsy) and said,
"We feel this data is less suspect in terms of privacy than other data."'"
d. Profiling and standards enforcement.
In the context of direct marketing and profiling, the enforceability of
fair information practices for profiling is limited. The absence of legal
rules translates into an absence of legal recourse for individuals facing
unfair information practices. Contractual remedies are only available to
businesses that are party to a profiling contract and could only rarely be
available to individuals.'" Industry norms and business practice are also
extremely weak on remedies for individuals. The DMA and its Ethics
Committee offer very limited industry oversight. Unfortunately, the Ethics
Committee is not an independent oversight authority charged with
properly balancing standards for information practice. It has rarely
sanctioned members for unfair information practices, and it can have little
credibility when members of the DMA Privacy Task Force itself ignore the
DMA Guidelines.'"
139. TRW Target Marketing Servs., Ethnic Markets Consumer Database (Fall 1992).
140. Claritas Advertisement, DM News, May 23, 1994, at 26.
141. Jerrold Ballinger, Metaxa to Roll Out Mailing Effort to Greek-Americans by End of
Year, DM News, Mar. 1, 1993, at 2.
142. Letter from Strubb Media Group, Inc. to Direct Marketers (on file with the University
of Iowa College of Law library).
143. Larry Tye, List-Makers Draw a Bead on Many, Boston Globe, Sept. 6, 1993, at 12.
144. Ray Schultz, Carlson, Metromail Offer Medical Data, DM News, June 21, 1993, at 1.
145. Individuals can assert contract remedies only if the agreement between the
contracting businesses specifically provides for individual recourse or if the individuals are
third party beneficiaries.
146. See Paul M. Alberta, DMA Suspends Direct American, DM News, July 19, 1993, at 1.
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2. Employment
Employment is critical to a healthy economy, and significant amounts
of personal information are critical to support employment relationships.
During the last twenty years, the American workplace has undergone a
substantive information revolution. The impact of information technology
on business decision making and increasing federal and state governmental
regulation of employment require employers to obtain and maintain more
employee personal information.47
Personnel record keeping is a vital activity in the labor market.
Employers must use personal information for basic management activities
including hiring, payroll processing, performance evaluations, and
promotion decisions. Standards for the treatment of personal information
must strike a difficult balance between employer needs for a productive
and safe work environment and employee rights to privacy.""
The treatment of personnel records generally addresses the commonly
accepted benchmark standards. Legal rules, industry norms, business
practice, and computer system architecture all exist to protect the
treatment of personal information in the employment context. There are
direct state laws governing information, practices in the workplace and
indirect rules arising as a result of other labor laws, such as the Labor
Management Standards Act, the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act, and the antidiscrimination laws. Information systems establish
structural separations between the personnel department and other
divisions of companies, and corporate policies also exist to go beyond the
other norms.
a. Personnel records and data quality standards
The benchmark standards for data quality are met to a certain degree
in the context of the treatment of personnel records. Legal rules require
purpose specifications for the collection of some personal information. 49
This Is the only case publicly reported in the trade industry newspaper over the last several
years. Significantly, even founding members of the DMA Privacy Task force do not seem to
take the trade association's commitment to fair information practices seriously. See Robin
Smith, DMA Privacy Task Force Works for Self-Regulation, DM News, Feb. 1, 1993, at 36
(responding in a letter to the editor to an article written by Rob Jackson of Donnelley
Marketing on privacy and marketing databases: "[W]hat distresses me is that Mr. Jackson
appears to be totally unaware of the work of the Direct Marketing Association's privacy task
force, made up of industry leaders including, as a founding member, John Cleary, president
of Donnelley Marketing.").
147. See David Linowes, Privacy in America 24 (1989) (arguing that personal privacy is
being Invaded by employers who are required by law to obtain personal information).
148. See Frank J. Cavico, Invasion of Privacy in the Private Employment Sector: Tortious
and Ethical Aspects, 30 Hous. L Rev. 1263, 1266 (1993).
149. See e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) (1988) (prescribing the information that employers must
collect and maintain for payroll purposes); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-56a20 (West Supp. 1994);
1995]
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Legal rules, in a few states, indirectly limit secondary uses of personal
information through the imposition of restraints on the disclosure of
personnel records. 50 They also impose relevancy with limitations on the
collection of certain types of unnecessary information for personnel
records."" Finally, legal rules in a number of states assure accuracy by
providing employees with statutory rights of access to their records and
statutory rights of correction for inaccurate information, in addition to
common-law duties.' 2
Additional benchmark standards for data quality are set in computer
system structure. Technical decisions often set company standards for
information retention. Large corporations, for example, establish record
system retention policies in order to limit the sheer size of archival
records.'53 As an illustration, IBM updates its files regularly and deletes
stale data on an identified schedule.'5
Industry norms and business practice can similarly offer important
purpose specifications and limitations on secondary use through data
security programs.' Fears of discrimination lawsuits and "smoking guns"
constrain employers from seeking overly extensive or sensitive personal
information without strong reasons"6 Company policies routinely give
employees access to their personnel files. 7 In addition, business practice
often includes security for employment records to prevent unauthorized
N.Y. Lab. Law § 679 (McKinney 1988).
150. See Cal. Lab. Code § 1198.5 (West Supp. 1995); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-128f (1993); In.
Comp. Stat. ch. 820, §§ 40/1-40/13 (1992); Mass. Gen. L ch. 149:52C (1992).
151. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (Supp. II 1991) (prohibiting collection of job applicant's
medical information if not specifically related to job performance); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 31-51i (West 1994) (imposing restrictions on use of information about arrest record of job
applicant obtained from application form); Ill. Comp. Stat. ch. 820, § 40/9 (1992)
(prohibiting collection of certain information of employees' nonemployment activities); Md.
Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. §§ 3-701, -702 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1994) (prohibiting collection
of certain psychological information); N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(d) (McKinney 1993)
(restricting employers from requesting certain information from job applicants); see also
Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that
employer may not collect information related to employee's religious beliefs or sexual
orientation), rev. dismissed 862 P.2d 148 (Cal. 1993).
152. See ag., Cal. Lab. Code § 1198.5 (West Supp. 1995); Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, § 732
(Supp. 1994); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit 26, § 631 (West Supp. 1994); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 275:56 (1987); Bulkin v. Western Kraft E., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 437, 442-45 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
(imposing common-law duty for employer to keep accurate personnel records).
153. SeeRichard D. Williams, Corporate Policies for Creation and Retention of Documents
(PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 332, 1987).
154. David F. Linowes & Ray C. Spencer, Privacy- The Workplace Issue of the '90s, 23 J.
Marshall L Rev. 591, 619 (1990).
155. See Linowes, supra note 147, at 30 (noting that IBM, for example, restricts access to
personal information on a need-to-know basis for employment purposes, thus minimizing
secondary use possibilities)..
156. See Steven C. Kahn et al., Personnel Director's Legal Guide 2.04[3], 9.01 (2d ed.
1990).
157. Eighty-seven percent of U.S. companies were reported to provide access. Linowes &
Spencer, supra note 154, at 594.
HeinOnline  -- 80 Iowa L. Rev. 525 1994-95
80 IOWA LAW REVIEW
access or tampering." s
b. Personnel records and transparency standards
The benchmarks for transparency are not emphasized in the context
of personnel record keeping. Legal rules create few obligations for
companies to provide employees with notice and consent for the treatment
of personal information. 9 Indirect standards from tort law, however, offer
some transparency."' Defamation cases provided companies with an
incentive to obtain employee consent before disseminating personnel
records.' Yet, technical systems for personnel records are not config-
ured to emphasize notice or consent.
Industry norms and business practice have not implemented the
benchmark transparency standards. The majority of U.S. companies do not
inform employees of the types of personal information that is collected,
the purposes for the data collection, or the intended disclosures of
personal information. 62 A significant minority of companies do, however,
have policies to inform employees of personnel record practices.'63 These
larger companies usually inform employees through general purpose
employee handbooks that are part of a personnel department's new
employee orientation program. Typically, companies will also request
authorization from employees prior to disclosing personnel information to
third parties.6 4
c. Personnel records and standards for sensitive information
Like the benchmark, standards for personnel records offer some
special treatment for sensitive data. Labor laws and employment
discrimination rules limit the types of sensitive information that employers
may collect.6" A tort against public disclosure of private facts, available
158. U.S. Council for Int'l Business, Statement on Examples of Privacy and Data
Protection Codes of Conduct in Use in the United States 7 (1991) [hereinafter US. Council].
159. If an employer wishes to make an "investigative consumer report" on an employee or
prospective employee, the person must be notified and, in the case of state law, may be
required to consent. Se- 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988) (requiring notice); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 380-
c (McKtnney 1984 & Supp. 1995) (requiring employee consent).
160. Tort damages such as those awarded in Sigal Constr. Corp. v. Stanbury, 586 A.2d
1204 (D.C. 1991), and O'Brien v. Papa Gino's of Am., Inc., 780 F.2d 1067 (1st Cir. 1986),
have led to corporate fears of liability for the disclosure of personal information without
consent. Sce Kahn et al., supra note 156, 7.03[4] Cc]; David Grant, Giving a Reference: Just
Name, Rank, and Salary History?, Legal Times, Nov. 30, 1987, at 16.
161. Yet, even this protection is fading. See Richard C. Reuben, Employment Lawyers
Rethink Advice, A.BA J., June 1994, at 32.
162. Linowes & Spencer, supra note 154, at594.
163. See LUnowes, supra note 147, at 41 (introducing results of a nationwide survey on the
privacy policies of Fortune 500 companies).
164. Id. at 42.
165. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (Supp. I1 1991) (prohibiting the collection of health data
[1995]
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under state common law, also affords special protection to sensitive data
and has particular application in the workplace. Usually, the tort requires a
wide dissemination of sensitive information;16 however, courts have
relaxed the requirement of broad public dissemination for disclosures in
the workplace."
Company practices frequently make secondary use of sensitive
information for decisions related to an employee, and few companies
inform employees of the practice. 1' Health information is particularly
problematic. Corporate "wellness" programs often collect sensitive
information about employees, ostensibly for the purpose of promoting
good health and reducing company insurance costs, and then make
secondary use of such information for decisions about the employees.l' 9
Some companies do set up contractual arrangements that better protect
sensitive employee data. For example, IBM arranges claim submission to
bypass corporate information systems in order to secure greater
confidentiality.'" Other companies, such as self-insured businesses, may
not seek such special protection for employee health data."'
d. Personnel records and enforcement standards
Standards for the enforceability of fair information practices do exist,
to some extent, for personnel records. Remedies are available for breaches
of statutory rights. Tort law also offers some possibility for remedies
benefiting aggrieved individuals. Business practices do not, however, afford
individuals direct redress, though violations of company policies may result
in the company sanctioning an offending agent
Standards for supervision are more widespread. Federal and state
unrelated to job functions); Hanlon &Wilson, Co. v. NLRB, 738 F.2d 606, 613 (3d Cir. 1984)
(interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 150(8) (a) (1) to prohibit employers from collecting information
about the union activities of employees); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14 (1994) (restricting use of
medical information obtained as part of an entry physical). Compliance with affirmative
action programs requires the collection of personal information about sex, race, ethnic
classification, and handicaps; however, the use of such information is restricted. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1602.7 (1994) (requiring reporting on Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Standard
Form 100).
166. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652D cmt. a (1977); Prosser, supra note 35, at
393.
167. Se e.g., Levias v. United Airlines, 500 N.E.2d 370, 373 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (holding
employer was not allowed to disclose medical information without employee's consent);
Sullivan v. Delta Airlines, supra note 135 (finding that employer invaded employee's privacy
by placing his name on list of employees suspected of HIV infection).
168. Linowes & Spencer, supra note 154, at 594 (stating that the majority of corporations
do not inform employees of the types of personal records that are maintained, how they are
used, and corporate disclosure practices).
169. S&e Ellen E. Schultz, Open Secrets: Medical Data Gathered by Firms Can Prove Less
Than Confidential, Wall St. J., May 18, 1994, at Al.
170. See Linowes & Spencer, supra note 154, at 612.
171. SeeWho's Reading Your Medical Records? Consumer Rep., Oct. 1994, at 628, 632.
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agencies have oversight for labor practices and jurisdiction to consider the
treatment of personnel records. Industry norms and business practice
impose standards for periodic company review of employment record
systems 7  Additionally, corporate policies may have a grievance
procedure for employees to complain about the treatment of personnel
records. 74
C. The Assessment of Standards in Key Contexts
The search for standards in the United States that enshrine the
commonly accepted benchmarks for treatment of personal information
yields a surprising, and disappointing, result. Dispersed sources in a robust
marketplace should, in theory, lead to the development of a complete and
tailored set of standards for particular contexts. Instead, the sheer
complexity of finding standards hinders both a dear understanding of
private sector practice and the implementation of benchmarks. Citizens are
at a loss to understand the treatment of personal information because of
the multilayered approach to" standards, and most corporate managers
generally do not want to be innovators on fair information practice
standards 75
The private sector reception of the benchmarks has been mixed. Data
quality standards of access and correction are stronger than standards -of
data collection and secondary use. At the same time, transparency
standards, sensitive data standards, and enforcement standards are weak.
The greater focus on access and correction underlies a bias in American
regulation to focus principally on the market process and to lose sight of
the inherent substance or quality of the "marketplace of ideas."
The U.S. standards-setting approach also defies current industry
practices. The narrow, dispersed approach assumes that the processing of
personal information will be limited to one context within a particular
industry or company. Today, companies' information practices challenge
this sectoral thinking because there is widespread, cross-sectoral use of
personal information.1 For example, data collected to execute a
172. For example, the federal Department of Labor, Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and their respective state
counterparts each have supervisory roles with respect to specific aspects of personnel record
keeping.
173. See Linowes & Spencer, supra note 154, at 596 (discussing corporate policies).
174. Sanctions may be available under grievance procedures to punish the offender within
the corporate structure, but are generally not available to afford direct redress to the
aggrieved employee.
175. See Louis Harris & Assocs., Inc., Privacy & American Business Survey of Interactive
Services, Consumers, and Privacy, at xii (1994) [hereinafter Privacy & American Business
Survey] (reporting that 78% of Americans believe they have lost control of how personal
Information is circulated and used by companies); Louis Harris & Assocs., Inc. & Alan F.
Westin, The Equifax Report on Consumers in the Information Age 98 (1990) (reporting that
few companies initiate privacy reviews); Smith, supra note 60, at 90-93.
176. See Joel . Reidenberg, Information Flows on the Global Infobahn, in The New
( 995]
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payment transaction now has utility for marketing profiles and may be used
by third parties outside the financial sector.
The search for U.S. standards ultimately reveals important
shortcomings in the treatment of personal information in the American
private sector. Specifically, there is a lack of transparency for the treatment
of personal information, abundant secondary use of personal information,
weak enforcement of fair information practice standards, and a
misallocation of standard-setting responsibilities.
1. Opaque Transparency
The hallmark of fair information practices is the ability of individuals
to participate meaningfully in society's information flows. The existence
and extent of information processing must be public for individuals to
have these opportunities. In key private sector contexts, notice to
individuals and* consent, if necessary, for the treatment of personal
information are deficient.' 77
Private sector companies often display an unusual degree of hubris in
justifying the failure to provide transparency. Companies believe that
personal information should be open to the company, but that the
concerned individuals have no right to know what the company is
doing.78 The private sector also takes the position that the use of
personal information is in the best interests of consumers, yet companies
simultaneously deny consumers the opportunity to judge this for
themselves.
The lack of transparency has an even greater negative significance on
the development of other standards through business practice.
Nontransparency blocks the evolution of dispersed standards. Transparency
forces companies to review their data quality and sensitive data practices.
Similarly, transparency necessitates broader, internal company polices in
order to inform individuals of the company practices. Transparency brings
public pressure to promote better standards of data quality. Without the
public scrutiny that transparency allows, companies do not feel compelled
to justify their information practices. When unjustifiable information
practices are transparent, public outrage can lead to prompt and
appropriate legislative action.1 79
The lack of transparency further poses a fundamental challenge to
interactive technologies. On an information highway, "lurkers," "slurpers,"
and "snoopers" abound. Lurkers monitor information flows over the
Information Infrastructure: Strategies for U.S. Policy (William J. Drake ed., forthcoming
1995).
177. See supra notes 124-31, 159-64 and accompanying text.
178. SeeLetter from Susan Coe Heitsch, supra note 122 (stating that treatment of personal
information is proprietary to the company).
179. Se, e.g., Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988) (protection accorded
to video rental records resulted from release ofJudge Bork's viewing habits during his ill-fated
nomination to the Supreme Court).
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network hidden from public view. Slurpers assemble and collate
information from multiple sources. Snoopers obtain information from
unsuspecting sources. Transparency is necessary to make these players
visible and distinguishable so that individuals or other suppliers of personal
information can have effective participation in all aspects of network
information flows.
2. Secondary Use
The benchmark standards for fair information practices place
considerable value on "finality." This is the principle that information
obtained for one purpose should not be used for other purposes without
consent from the individual concerned. As seen in the direct marketing
and employment contexts, secondary use is a problem in the U.S. private
sector, particularly with respect to marketing applications.' °
The problem of secondary use is accentuated for sensitive
information. 8' An enormous commercial market exists, for example, in
secondary use of health information.8 2 Interactive technology now also
allows isolated bits of personal information to be amassed and profiled to
create "new" sensitive data. For example, it is easy to construct a list of
married Catholics with small families who support abortion. 83
The fragmented sources for American standards for the treatment of
personal information invite a permanent problem for secondary use.
Personal information gathered in one context has value for other uses.
There will be unrelenting pressure for companies to re-use personal
information in a secondary fashion . 4 Without effective transparency,
companies have unfettered discretion to determine the uses for personal
information. This inexorably leads to myopia in how companies
characterize information use and how they use data in deviation from the
original purposes.' s5
180. See supra notes 105-07, 112-20, 150, 168-71 and accompanying text.
181. Seesupra notes 112-20, 168-71 and accompanying text.
182. For example, one of the principal rationales offered for the merger between Merck,
the large pharmaceutical company, and Medco, one of the nation's largest mail order
pharmacies, was to utilize the individual prescription records and purchasing histories
contained in Medco's database. SeJoseph Weber & Rochelle Shoretz, Is This Rx Too Costly
for Merck?, Bus. Wk, Aug. 9, 1993, at 28.
183. Planned Parenthood sells its list of donors, and demographic information is widely
available to match the list by religion, age, family size, income, and marital status. Se Craver,
Mathews, Smith Awards 16 Files to ALC, DM News, Sept. 13, 1993, at 37 (including list of
Planned Parenthood members and donors); Claritas Advertisement, DM News, May 23, 1994,
at 26 (the PRIZM 4 offers matching according to family demographics); TRW Target
Marketing Servs., supra note 139 (offering ethnic selections).
184. Se Smith, supra note 60, at 74-80 (describing large databases of consumer
Information currently used for psychographic marketing).
185. See id. at 86-90 (discussing cognitive dissonance even among corporate information
system managers).
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3. Lightweight Enforcement
Fair information practices must be enforceable in an Information
Society. Under the system of targeted standards in the United States,
private enforcement is preferred to government sanction. Narrow, targeted
standards and the corresponding reliance on self-regulation depend on the
market for enforcement of fair information practices."'e The scarcity of
legal rules limits the option of private enforcement. Remedies for citizens
and supervision of companies are lacking in key contexts.' 87
In the absence of legal rules, the emphasis on self-regulation poses a
threshold obstacle to effective enforcement companies have little incentive
to police themselves. Bad practices can easily be hidden through
nontransparency, and organized industry efforts are not serious about
enforcement. ' " In addition, there are other formidable obstacles to
private enforcement. The cost for an individual to pursue a claim for
unfair information practices is prohibitive, and the real harm from unfair
information practice is not monetary, but rather dignitary and societal 1 9
These are often not covered by the liability provisions of relevant statutes
or industry policies.
4. Misallocated Responsibility
The reliance on targeted standards in the U.S. private sector places a
preponderant emphasis on voluntary industry norms and business practice.
This allocates complete responsibility for standards to the business
participants in private sector information exchanges. However, since
transparency is missing in key contexts, individuals and society as a whole
are ill-equipped to exercise any influence on standards setting.
Responsibility for the existence and creation of standards, thus, rests fully
on corporations. Yet, the business world shoulders this responsibility for
information practice without -accountability precisely because so many
aspects of business practices are obscured from public view and there are
few means of either public or private enforcement.
The haphazard and incomplete character of the existing standards in
key contexts demonstrates that the allocation of responsibility to establish
fair information practice from dispersed sources has not worked. The
objective of tailored standards through an aggregation of dispersed sources
cannot realistically be achieved.
186. For example, the United States has rejected until now the creation of any regulatory
commission to enforce fair information practices.
187. See supra notes 145-46, 172-74 and accompanying text.
188. The significance of the DMA Ethics Committee is a good example of this. Despite the
skewed treatment of personal information in the direct marketing industry, the Ethics
Committee focuses on deceptive advertising and not on fair information practices.
189. An individual must budget at least $150-250 per hour for legal fees. See Judy
Sarasohn, In Search of Alternatives: Client Pressure Holds Down Fees, Legal Times, Nov. 22,
1993, at 13.
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III. THE SUBVERSIVE EFFECT OF TARGETED LEGAL STANDARDS
The evolution of standards for information practices in the private
sector poses a paradox for the goals embodied in the pursuit of targeted
standards. The noncomprehensive approach to standards seeks to preserve
identity and liberty in American democracy.'9 ° The weak development of
benchmark standards in key contexts means that the approach has instead
fostered a concentration of economic and political power in American
society and has diminished that very identity and liberty cherished by
citizens."'
More than fifteen years ago, the U.S. Privacy Protection Study
Commission identified a number of key sectors that had tremendous
impact on the lives of citizens.' The Commission worried that treatment
of personal information in these sectors corresponded to an obvious
potential for the improper coercion of citizens by private sector actors.93
Even in the most closely regulated of these sectors, namely financial
services and telecommunications, the targeted legal protections
emphasized minimal restraint on information flows; accuracy protections
rather than collection and purpose limitations were predominant.
194
Over the last decade, there has been a concentration of information
power under private control.' The commonly accepted benchmarks for
fair information practice to preserve citizen participation in the flows of
personal information have not emerged through targeted stkndards.
Contrary to the purposes of targeted standards, individuals have lost
identity to computer profiles and models and have lost power in society.
Targeted standards have created information flows that suffer from
intractable inequities and frustrate the very objectives of the narrow and
dispersed approach to standards setting in the United States.
A. Failures in the Information Market
The reliance on the marketplace to define standards faces formidable
problems. The marketplace does not have a level playing field and contains
destructive internal inconsistencies. In this "marketplace" of personal
information, the system of targeted standards fails to assure citizens fair
190. Identity and liberty are intrinsically linked to the private sector treatment of personal
information. See generally Fried, supra note 36 (arguing that the right to control the disdosure
of personal information to others is part of political and social interchange); Herbert Maisl,
]2tat de la legislation frangaise et tendences de la jurisprudence relatives i la protection des
donndes personnelles, 39 Revue internationale de droit compar6 559 (1987).
191. See infra text accompanying notes 212-35.
192. See Privacy Comm'n, supra note 8, at 37-39 (identifying, inter alia, the following as key
sectors: financial services, direct marketing, employment, health care, government, and
education).
193. See generaly id.
194. See Reidenberg, supra note 11, at 210-16.
195. See Reidenberg, supra note 176.
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participation and treats citizens inequitably.
1. The Skewed "Marketplace"
In the absence of the benchmark standards, political weight is greatly
skewed in favor of the collectors and manipulators of personal
information. At the same time, the reliance on targeted standards allocates
to these actors the role of developing industry norms and business
practices that require shared decision making with citizens. This presents
an inherent conflict of interest. The only way to preserve some semblance
of control over the disclosure of personal information in American society
is to withdraw entirely and live a hermit's life.
The development of fair information practices through the
marketplace faces profound structural problems. Posner has argued that
absent any legal protections, the market will efficiently create fair "privacy"
or information practice results.19 This argument depends on the triviality
of transaction costs, externalities, and imperfect information.'9 The
absence of benchmark standards results, however, in precisely the reverse
situation: a marketplace with high transaction costs, important
externalities, and a significant level of imperfect information.
Dispersed standards allow transparency of information practices to be
obscured. With obscured transparency, citizens face an extraordinary and
often insurmountable burden if they even attempt to learn about
information practices. Companies control the disclosure of their practices
and suffer no penalties for refusing to disclose. In fact, companies may
suffer harm if they do disclose their inappropriate practices as a result of
negative backlashes"9 Industry norms and practice preclude citizen
involvement in the circulation of personal information. Without notice,
consent, and access, it is impossible for an individual even to discover how,
where, when, and why personal information is circulating. In economic
terms, this obscured transparency raises transaction costs and allocates
them to citizens.
There is also an external effect from the circulation of personal
information without direct citizen participation. The failure to include
citizens in the information decision-making process affects political and
196. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 Ga. IL Rev. 393 (1978)
(arguing that individuals should not have protection for personal information because such
protection would distort efficient market functions).
197. See George J. Stigler, The Citizen and the State: Essays on Regulation 104-07 (1975)
(arguing that these points must be minimal for the market to function effectively). Posner
assumed transaction costs would be low when individuals are assigned no rights by the state.
Posner, supra note 196, at 398. He minimized the externalities, or social cost, of limited
protection for individuals and bypassed the question of perfect or imperfect information. Id.
at 412-13. Interestingly, Posner also argued for protection against eavesdropping and
surveillance because the transaction costs for eavesdropping would be greater if the individual
has no protection. Id. at 401. Fair information practice standards seek to provide exactly that:
protection against surveillance.
198. See Smith, supra note 60, at 85-93.
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social interchange.'" Society as a whole is altered by the treatment of
personal information without fair information practice standards.
Distinctions between public and private activity disintegrate and social
dynamics change as informational power shifts.
The weak standards for the accuracy of circulating personal
information create a two-way condition of "imperfect information." The
lack of participation by individuals in the market of circulating information
prevents business from obtaining the best information for decision
making.2 Business is often unable to correct errors in circulating
personal information because the problems may only be discovered by the
concerned individuals.0 1  Citizens also face imperfect information.
Because customized products, services, and advertising are developed based
upon information profiles, a citizen's vision of society is increasingly
narrowed. The greater reliance citizens place on interactive services for
daily life, including news, shopping, and household finance, the more
citizens lose a broad view of the Information Society.2 2
2. Self-Destructing Targets
The system of targeted standards has become self-destructive for the
U.S. private sector. The lack of fair information practices produces costly
embarrassment to companies.03 In rare instances of transparency, public
pressure and congressional interest have forced companies to abandon or
modify products after development.m
The narrow focus of targeted standards and the absence of
benchmarks for fair information practice intensify internal conflicts for
many large companies in their treatment of personal information.20
199. See genffalj Westin, supra note 5; Fried, supra note 36.
200. One recent audit of consumer profile lists in the direct marketing industry found
surprising levels of inaccuracy. Ray Schultz, List Accuracy Rated in Leo Burnett Audit, DM
News, Sept. 19, 1994, at 1 (noting that list accuracy ranged from 21% when profiling income
to 95% when profiling home ownership).
201. Id.
202. To regain the broad view of society, citizens must deviate from the norm. Such
deviations are likely to involve substantial effort and cost.
203. See Reidenberg, supra note 176.
204. See Domestic and International Data Protection Issues: Hearinga Before the
Subcomm. on Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture of the House Comm. on
Government Operations, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1991) (statement ofJohn Baker, Senior Vice
President, Equifax, discussing the abandoned Lotus-Equifax consumer database); Markey
Widens Inquiry. AOL Defends its Privacy Policy on Mail Lists, Comm. Daily, Oct. 11, 1994, at
1 (referring to America Online's new notice policy following embarrassing publicity); Terry
Brennan, CADM Releases Its Unanimous Objection to AT&T 800 Directory, Joins Other
Industry Leaders, DM News, Oct. 7, 1991, at 1 (discussing the objections to distribution of an
AT&T directory of 800 numbers).
205. Various departments within a single organization will have drastically different views
on fair Information practices for specific personal information. For example, in a financial
Institution, the marketing group will seek secondary use of account information, while th
customer relations group may view transaction records as confidential for billing purposes
1995]
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Products and product quality in an information economy depend
increasingly on a complete set of standards for fair information practice.
Incomplete standards and poor standards threaten the future of
information-based businesses by jeopardizing the long-term vitality of their
products and services.
For the long-term, business is beginning to grasp that better standards
for fair information practice can be a competitive advantage and will be
necessary for business survival . Yet, companies are generally myopic
and only see immediate revenue from the sale of personal information.2 07
In the short-run, most companies still affirmatively resist developing
standards.208 Business reluctance to embrace setting standards preserves a
destructive process for the development of the Information Society.M
B. Frustrating the Justification for Targeted Standards
The targeted standards approach to fair information practices
enshrines inequities for citizens in the circulation of personal information.
The approach also imposes structural hurdles that business must overcome
to improve standards. Those results collectively challenge the underlying
justification for the targeted standards approach.
To restrain abuses of power and attempts at thought control, the
United States has long resisted government interference with personal
only.
206. See Dun & Bradstreet, supra note 65; Equifax 1991 Report, supra note 65; Privacy &
Am. Bus., Sept./Oct. 1993, at 15 (setting forth Pacific Bell commitment to fair information
practices). Two of these prominent examples stem from earlier instances of public
embarrassment. Equifax developed'a deep commitment to stronger fair information practices
following the abandonment of the Lotus-Equifax consumer database. Pacific Bell similarly
adopted a fair information practices cbde following a controversy over its plan to sell
subscriber information.
207. Trans Union, for example, sells marketing profiles based upon information contained
in its credit reporting databases. While credit reporting is regulated by the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988), Trans Union's secondary use of the information is
inconsistent with benchmark standards of fair information practice. Trans Union's
competitors, TRW and Equifax, no longer engage in the same practice. Trans Union, thus,
has information products that face no competition. The Federal Trade Commission objects to
Trans Union's practice under the Fair Credit Reporting Act and Trans Union is aggressively
challenging an FTC order. See Trans Union Corp., 59 Fed. Reg. 55,669 (FTC 1994);
Washington Regulatory Reporting Assocs., FrC: Watch, No. 426-Credit Reporting (Jan. 16,
1995), available in LEXIS, Trade Library, FTCWAT File (stating that United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia "stayed an FTC order requiring Trans Union to halt its
direct-marketing lists business"). In the event that Trans Union wins its challenge, Congress
has expressed interest in prohibiting Trans Union's practice. See H.R. 5178, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1994); H.R. 1015, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 783, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
Despite such opposition, Trans Union makes money in the short run.
208. See Smith, supra note 60, at 85-86, 90.
209. Eg., Privacy & American Business Survey, supra note 175 (finding that refusing to
develop fair information standards will dissuade potential users of interactive services from
participating in network transactions).
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rights.2 0 Freedom in the circulation of personal information, however,
has neither prevented the manipulation of citizens nor supported citizen
liberty and the accepted role of the state in economic affairs.
1. Manipulation of Citizens
One of the earliest government studies of computers and society
made the profound insight that the concentration of information
techniques leads to an imbalance of political power.212 The ubiquitous
availability of extensive information risks the manipulation, molding, and
adjustment of individual conduct. The citizen loses power to other actors
in society when computer models define individual conduct and when
deviations from predicted behavior are questioned.1 Information traces
of individual conduct, such as transaction records from interactive
communications, lead to the manipulation of social engagement. Services
and products will be offered to the individual based on predictions from
these interactive patterns. This has the positive effect of offering consumers
information about goods and services that they are likely to find interesting
or appealing. At the same time, these selective offerings have the more
nefarious consequence of limiting an individual's "information horizon"
and stereotyping citizens.
The private sector has precisely the type of dossiers that the public
has long feared government would abuse.214 In many ways, private data
files substitute for the lack of state data bases.215 It is particularly telling
that the FBI, with all its surveillance resources, still went to the direct
marketing industry to obtain personal information. 6
At the present time, one important result of the existing limited set of
standards is that large corporate interests structure decision making
through their hidden control of information flows. Companies both create
and enforce information standards without public scrutiny. The effect is
subtle, but significant. As interactive communications become ever more
crucial to everyday life, goods and services will be offered primarily on the
basis of transaction data profiles. What a subscriber has done in the past
will dictate what is offered in the future. Such behavioral stereotyping
censors the information delivered to the citizen 17 In addition, the
210. &esupra note 18-54 and accompanying text.
211. Professor Sunstein has argued a similar point. Sunstein, supra note 31, at 197-256.
212. Rapport de la Commission Informatique et Libert6s 77 (1975) (report of a French
government commission established to consider the impact of computers on freedom and
society and to make recommendations'for government action).
213. See Simitis, supra note 3, at 710-12, 720-24; Hearings, supra note 7, at 61, 69
(statement ofJoel R. Reidenberg, Associate Professor, Fordham Univ. School of Law).
214. See Linowes, supra note 147, at 156-67.
215. See Simitis, supra note 3, at 725.
216. Ray Schultz, FBI Said to Seek Compiled Lists for Use in Its Field Investigations, DM
News, Apr. 20, 1992, at 1. Ironically, the marketing industry declined to provide information
to the FBL Ray Schultz, Big Compilers Say No to the FBI, DM News, May 4, 1992, at 1.
217. For example, on the Prodigy network, interactions are profiled and each subscriber
1995]
HeinOnline  -- 80 Iowa L. Rev. 536 1994-95
SETTING STANDARDS
control of these information resources without citizen knowledge
empowers corporations to engage in thought control. Without knowledge
of the specific commercial sources of personal information or the basis for
particular profiles, citizens cannot effectively evaluate alternatives.1
Critiques of recent Supreme Court privacyjurisprudence highlight an
important shift and a growing concern for protection against the
manipulation of citizens 9 The "old privacy" doctrine sought to protect
against government surveillance of citizens such as the intrusion of the
police into "marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contracep-
tives."tm The "new privacy" doctrine seeks to protect citizens from
coercive choices about how to live their lives, such as a state ban on a
woman's right to choose.nl This evolution shifts the conception of abuse
of power from fear of surveillance to fear of control of thought and social
interaction. A similar potential abuse now emanates from private use of
personal information.
The concept that private control of information flows risks significant
potential for citizen manipulation is not new. There is a unique strand in
U.S. telecommunications policy that seeks to harness private sector control
of information flows as a means to manipulate citizens. For example, the
fairness doctrine requires private broadcast stations to air opposing points
of view,an and the "must carry" doctrine requires private cable television
companies to offer public service channels.!2 In Red Lion Broadcasting v.
FCC,4 the Supreme Court upheld the fairness rule in order to protect
the public's right of access to free thought. The Court said: "It is the
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace
of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance
monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a
private licensee." 22 More recently, in Turner Broadcasting v. FCC,m the
Supreme Court similarly upheld the "must carry" rule because the "basic
tenet of national communications policy that 'the widest possible
sees a customized set of product advertisements based on the profile. The subscriber is thus
cut off from other product information.
218. See generally C. Edwin Baker, Advertising a Democratic Press, 140 U. Pa. L Rev. 2097
(1992) (discussing manipulative effects of advertising).
219. See Sandel, supra note 21, at 525 (arguing that "old" privacy rhetoric emphasizes
protection from surveillance and "new" privacy rests on protection for particular forms of
conduct). See generally Rubenfeld, supra note 22 (arguing that privacy rights must restrain the
government from dictating choices about citizen conduct that are fundamental to
individuality).
220. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
221. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
222. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
223. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
224. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
225. Id. at 390.
226. 114S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
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dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is
essential to the welfare of the public. ' " ' Under this jurisprudence,
standards for public participation in information flows are critical to
avoiding citizen manipulation. The lack of standards for fair information
practice in the private sector prevents precisely the type of participation
that the Court deems essential to the welfare of the public.
2. The Reversal of Liberty
The market failure and the shift in information power reverses the
evolution of the concept of liberty and the role of the state that took place
in the United States between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Modem liberty for citizens requires an ability to participate in flows of
personal information, if not the ability to exercise control over those
flows.sss Early America viewed personal information as private, and
significant efforts were made to limit the amount of personal information
in the public realm.ns The more colonialists adapted to New World
conditions and found open space, the more protective they became of
solitude and isolation from others. In the congested urban centers of
the industrial age, the same sense of isolation or solitude could be found
in "protective anonymity." 211 An individual could be in a public place, yet
still seek or assume freedom from personal identification.2 2
The search for solitude and protective anonymity meant that citizens
had full participatory power in the circulation of personal information.
Citizens acquired an important liberty through the exercise of control over
flows of personal information. Nineteenth century U.S. courts gradually
enshrined the notion of inviolable physical and mental spaces" The
state, through the increase of citizen rights, promoted such liberty. The
First Amendment grew to secure information flows in support of the
process for democratic political judgments and the respect for polity.2
The First Amendment promoted liberty for individuals as participants in a
227. Id. at 2470 (citations omitted).
228. See Glendon, supra note 17, at 52-54 (noting the American development of privacy as
an extension of liberty); Westin, supra note 5, at 7 (stating that privacy is the complete
control by individuals in determining the disclosure of personal information to others); Fried,
supra note 36, at 493 (stating that privacy consists of the right of individuals to define
themselves for others); Miller, supra note 10, at 1107 (stating that privacy entails the control
of the flow of information about individuals); Simitis, supra note 3, at 232-37 (arguing that
data protection is necessary for citizens to participate in democracy).
229. SeeNote, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 Harv. L Rev. 1892,
1895-96, 1900-01 (1981) (discussing emergence of right to exclude others from private
property and the right to control the disclosure of private communications).
230. See David Flaherty, Privacy in Colonial New England, 26 (1972).
231, Richard F. Hixson, Privacy in a Public Society 9 (1987).
232. SeeWestin, supra note 5, at 31-32.
233. See Note, supra note 229, at 1895-96, 1900-01.
234, See Sunstein, supra note 31, at 220; see also Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tex.
L. Rev. 1387 (1984).
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democratic society as distinct from the notion of liberty for individuals to
make private consumption choices.2
Today, with targeted standards and the corresponding treatment of
personal informatiqn, citizen liberty resembles the early colonial
experience without any of the developments over the centuries. The
combination of current technology and existing targeted standards erode
protective anonymity. "Information traces" destroy anonymity. Individuals
perceive transactions in public places, such as the purchase of groceries at
the supermarket or books at the bookstore, as anonymous activities, yet
information records collected and maintained by store computer systems
enable these activities to be personalized. Stores and other third parties
can link specific transactions to individuals. Citizens no longer have the
freedom to choose the terms of personal information disclosure and
consequently have lost the capacity to participate in decisions about
societal information flows. This denial of participation inherently
manipulates citizens; liberty for the control of personal information reverts
back in time.
3. Usurping the State
The transfer to business of control of personal information flows,
coupled with continued dispersion of standards for fair information
practice, usurps the role of the modern American state. After the New
Deal, the state became a more active participant in economic affairs, and
the courts sought to give greater protection to personal liberties. Following
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish2 and United States v. Carolene Products,27 the
Supreme Court upheld economic regulation more readily than restrictions
on certain fundamental personal freedoms, such as freedom of
communication. Ironically, the underpinning of dispersed standards is
to preserve personal rights--the freedom from manipulation and abuse of
power. Yet, the combination of minimal restraints to protect personal
information and of dispersed standards creates broader protection for
commercial interests than for individual interests. Business has unchecked
discretion to determine the terms and conditions of the circulation of vast
amounts of personal information.
The treatment of personal information is actually confused between
the two ideologies of economic and personal freedoms. Flows of personal
information raise significant commercial stakes while at the same time
implicating personal freedoms. Personal information is an economic asset.
Accordingly, like other economic assets, the Supreme Court's jurispru-
235. Sunstein, supra note 31, at 220.
236. 300 U.S. 379, 393-94 (1937) (upholding a state minimum wage law).
237. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938) (suggesting that legislation impinging on personal
liberties may be subject to more exacting scrutiny than economic regulations).
238. See Glendon, supra note 17, at 4-5; Harry N. Scheiber, Economic Liberty and the
Constitution, in Essays in the History of Liberty. Seaver Institute Lectures at the Huntington
Library 75, 84-86 (1988).
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dence on economic regulation should apply. However, because personal
information implicates individual rights, courts and society tend to
scrutinize regulation and restrictions on the flow of personal information
as a limitation on cherished First Amendment freedoms.ns While the
courts give less protection to commercial speech, advertising and
commercial messages do enjoy some protection.240
The circulation of personal information, however, is not like the
traditional commercial speech cases involving advertising or the
communication of a commercial message. Restraints on the circulation of
personal information would not damage the communication of a message.
Rather, the regulation of the treatment of personal information would
secure participation by citizens in the communications process. Moreover,
in commercial speech cases, courts are willing to uphold regulations if the
government can regulate the underlying economic activity.
241
The continued pursuit of target standards in the face of market
failure and frustrated goals abdicates the proper role of the post-New Deal
state.242 The Constitution is not inconsistent with the government
securing a more balanced market in information.245 At the same time, the
targeted standards present a classic case for justified economic regulation.
Society cannot expect the private sector to self-regulate when the short-
term costs of setting high standards is considerable and the significant
transaction costs for citizens limits countervailing pressure on companies.
Furthermore, citizen manipulation and reductions of liberty cry out for
intervention.
IV. THE FOREiGN AID TO A REvivAL OF DEMOCRATic VALUES
The U.S. private sector faces serious pressure to rebalance
information practices and to restore the values underlying the targeted
standards approach. In addition to growing discord within the United
239. See, e.g., Lovgren v. Citizens First Nat'l Bank, 534 N.E.2d 987, 988-91 (ilL 1989)
(suggesting that privacy tort has similar concerns to defamation and First Amendment);
Arrington v. New York Times Co., 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1321 (N.Y. 1982) (interpreting New York
statute codifying the privacy misappropriation tort to exclude newspaper publication from
commercial use under First Amendment reasoning).
240. See SEC v. Wall St. Publishing Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(explaining that injunction against publication of monthly stock market magazine not
prohibited by First Amendment); Towers Fin. Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 803 F. Supp.
820, 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (allowing a restraining order against the publication of commercial
speech); Ohio State Bar Ass'n v. Ohralik, 357 N.E.2d 1097, 1099 (Ohio 1976) (rejecting First
Amendment defense by defendant attorney suspended from practice for improper client
solicitation).
241. Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (holding that
advertising for gambling could be regulated because the government had the power to
regulate gambling itself).
242. See Sunstein, supra note 31, at 230 (arguing that the New Deal for speech means
regulation to further democratic deliberation and diversity of participation).
243. See id. at 256.
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States, foreign interest in and concern over U.S. standards is an unusual,
but important, force driving a return to the democratic value of protecting
citizens against thought manipulation and abuses of power. Unlike the ad
hoc, narrowly tailored standards of the United States, foreign standards
often offer comprehensive legal norms for the treatment of personal
information. Divergent norms among various countries in a global
information economy are problematic. Global information processing,
thus, requires the U.S. private sector to consider trends in foreign
standards of fair information practice.
The original European data protection proposal2" has served as a
wake-up call for information practice standards in the U.S. private sector.
The initial business reaction to the proposed directive was loud and
negative, but the need to respond galvanized American companies to
evaluate their information practice policies. 2" Trade associations began
or reinvigorated the process of drafting codes of conduct. 2" Similarly,
European interest stimulated scrutiny in U.S. policy-making circles of fair
information practice norms. Both legislative and executive branch officials
began to evaluate U.S. standards in light of the more comprehensive
European principles.247
Existing and emerging foreign standards lead to scrutiny of industry
norms and business practice.24 Because offihore data processing may
compromise the treatment of personal information, the evaluation of
nonlocal standards becomes a regulatory problem. Foreign regulators have
expressed specific interest in U.S. private sector standards. The
Commission of the European Communities has, for example, sponsored a
comparative-law study of U.S. and European data protection.249 Foreign
privacy commissioners have voiced concerns about American standards.2°
Other commissions have prohibited data flows to the United States on the
ground of unfair information practices in the United States.2"
244. See Original Proposal, supra note 75.
245. Se- e.g., U.S. Council, supra note 158.
246. See, e.g., Information Industry 'Ass'n, supra note 62 (stating that guidelines were
developed "to assist companies in their development of policies and practices" following
adoption of a 1990 policy statement on privacy).
247. Se4 ag., Working Group on Privacy, Information Infrastructure Task Force, Draft
Principles for Providing and Using Personal Information, 59 Fed. Reg. 27,206 (1994), revised by
Working Group on Privacy, Information Infrastructure Task Force, National Information
Infrastructure-Draft Principles for Providing and Using Personal Information and
Commentary, 60 Fed. Reg. 4362 (1995) (containing an executive branch review of fair
information practices and attempt to articulate norms that satisfy international standards);
Hearings, supra note 7 (discussing the integrity of telecommunications transmissions and
networks and encryption and telecommunications network security).
248. See Reidenberg, supra note 56, at 294-96.
249. SeePaul M. Schwartz &Joel R. Reidenberg, A Study of American Data Protection Law
& Practice: Report to the Commission of the European Communities (forthcoming).
250. Private discussions with data protection officials at international meetings, such as the
annual Privacy Laws & Business conference at Cambridge University, reveal this concern.
251. See U.K. Office of the Data Protection Registrar, Seventh Annual Report 33-34 (1990)
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With the disappointing aggregation of standards under the U.S.
targeted approach, this scrutiny raises challenges for global information
flows. In particular, foreign data protection commissioners can and do seek
to assure fair treatment of exported personal information. The weakness in
U.S. targeted standards poses an important obstacle for global private
sector activities and undermines the U.S. approach to information practice
standards. The very search to accommodate global information flows
pressures the United States to restore the underlying objectives subverted
by the disappointing and unsuccessful targeted standards. American
information practices can be connected to foreign standards through
narrow comparisons and a reallocation of responsibility for international
data flows. A key consequence of any such solution to the problem of
international data flows is an increase in citizen participation in the
treatment of personal information through reallocation of responsibility
and the creation of corporate incentives to support general, rather than
targeted, standards. This international influence pushes a
reconceptualization of the philosophy of minimal restraints on information
flows.
A. Foreign Pressure on U.S Targeted Standards
The foreign pressure to reform U.S. standards has two distinct
features. First, foreign legal rules authorize data protection agencies to
prohibit the flow of personal information to countries perceived as having
insufficient standards of fair information practice. s Second, these
foreign restraints on transborder data flows undermine the U.S. targeted
approach by raising the stakes for U.S. businesses of unsuccessful self-
regulation.
1. Precise Restraints on Transborder Data FRows
National laws in many countries already authorize government data
protection agencies to prohibit the transfer of personal information if the
destination has insufficient privacy standards255 In light of these existing
provisions, the proposed European directive on data protection was a
catalyst for renewed fear regarding restrictions on international data flows.
The first version of the proposAl contemplated a blacldist of countries with
inadequate standards for the fair treatment of personal information.2
With the targeted standards in the United States, American business
[hereinafter Data Protection Registrar] (prohibiting data export to the United States); see also
Reldenberg, supra note 69, at S162-65 (discussing data export prohibitions).
252. See Reidenberg, supra note 69, at S160-65.
253. See generally Loi no. 78-17 du 25janvier 1978, art. 24 (Fr.); Data Protection Act, 1984,
§ 12(2) (U.K.); Martine Briat, Personal Data and the Free Flow of Information, in Freedom of
Data Flows and EEC Law (1988); Nugter, supra note 13; Peter Blume, An EEC Policy for Data
Protection, 11 Computer L.J. 399 (1992); Michael Kirby, Legal Aspects of Transborder Data
Flow, 11 Computer LJ. 233 (1991); Reidenberg, supra note 69, at S137, S160-65 (1992).
254. Original Proposal, supra note 75, art. 24.
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thought the European Commission would be obliged to blacklist the
United States. The high stakes and inappropriate nature of a general
assessment of non-European standards led to a more permissive provision
in a revision of the proposal.2- Following the revised proposal, the
Council of Ministers adopted a common position on a new text that
compromises between the European Commission's first and second
versions. The Council's draft contains an important clause that requires
the examination of data transfers outside the European Union and
mandates that member states block data flows to countries that the
European Commission identifies as "inadequate," yet permits transfers to
blacklisted destinations if a case-by-case review can demonstrate that
satisfactory standards will be applied in the particular case.2
Outside Europe, the proposal has also had a spill-over effect on
precise restraints. For example, in Canada, the provincial legislature of
Qu6bec enacted a provision that enables the Quebec privacy commission to
scrutinize private sector data transfers.27 Similarly, Hong Kong undertook
a review of its fair information practices standards through the Law Reform
Commission.
In many ways, the proposal masks the real action likely to occur at the
national level in Europe. The debate over the course of the proposal seems
to have harnessed national authorities. Shortly before the release of the
first draft of the proposal, both France and the United Kingdom issued
public prohibitions of the export of personal information2 9 Since then,
data protection authorities have voiced grave concerns about international
data transfers, but have refrained from taking public actions.ee Once the
proposal is finalized, the push toward greater scrutiny of international data
transfers is likely to stimulate national data protection agencies with a new
European-wide mandate to consider international data flows.
255. See Amended Proposal, supra note 75, art. 26; Reidenberg, supra note 56, at 293
(arguing that the Original Proposal was actually less likely to result in transfer prohibitions
than the Amended Proposal).
256. See Common Position, supra note 75, arts. 25-26.
257. SeeAn Act respecting the protection of personal information in the private sector, ch.
17, 1993 S.Q. 503 (Can.) (to be codified at R.S.Q. ch. P-39.1) (requiring that the collection,
storage, use, or communication of personal information on behalf of another party must
conform to the standards established in the law); Paul-Andr6 Comeau & Andr6 Ouimet,
Freedom of Information and Privacy. Quebec's Innovative Role in North America, 80 Iowa L.
Rev. 651 (1995).
The Qu6bec law also reflects a new commitment to fair information practices found
growing around the world. The Quebec legislature enacted this most recent data protection
law unanimously.
258. Law Reform Comm'n of H.K, Report on Reform of the Law Relating to the
Protection of Personal Data (1994).
259. D6liberation no. 89-78 du 11 juillet 1989, reprinted in Commission nationae de
l'informatique et des libertas, 10e Rapport au president de la Rlpublique et au Parlement
1989, at 32-34 (1990) [hereinafter CNIL]; Data Protection Registrar, supra note 251, at 3334.
260. Paul Waterschoot, EC Directive Update, in Proceedings of the XVth International
Conference of Data Protection & Privacy Commissioners 160 (1993).
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2. Raising the Stakes fqr Global Business
Foreign rules that allow data protection agencies to block transfers of
personal information to the United States and the growing concern over
international data flows raise the stakes for American business and
undermine the targeted approach. Foreign data protection regulators will
search to make determinations about the sufficiency of U.S. standards. Just
as the U.S. standards derive from accepted American beliefs in certain
political principles, foreign standards embody the particular democratic
values of foreign societies.261 The scrutiny of U.S. targeted standards
requires a way to compare divergent legal rules and to accommodate
global information flows without diminishing fair information practices.
2
Without a full set of legal rules to establish the benchmark standards
for fair information practice, context becomes vital to determine the actual
standards of practice applied to the treatment of personal information.
Because standards arise from dispersed sources in the United States, the
actual implementation of fair information practices offers the only
appropriate basis to compare U.S. standards to foreign standards. For the
comparison to be meaningful, the examination of standards must search
for "functional similarity" in specific contexts. If the totality of standards
resulting from divergent sources in the United States is functionally similar
to the foreign standards for a particular situation, then any restraint on
information flows would be entirely unwarranted. This inquiry focuses on
the aggregate, substantive standards that are applied to personal
information, rather than on the means or sources of norms. Functional
similarity allows a comparison of divergent approaches to fair information
practice without imposing values from either legal system on the other.26
Although narrow comparisons support freer flows of information, the
contextual analysis offers precision for the identification of the
inconsistencies between actual U.S. standards and the underlying American
policy goals. While there are major U.S. businesses that adhere to high
standards of fair information practice, the U.S. private sector bears an
important and significant burden. Particular companies must define an
appropriate evaluation context for foreign regulators and demonstrate that
the aggregation of targeted standards in the relevant context is satisfactory.
The inconsistency between American standards and underlying values
foreshadows significant difficulties for the U.S. private sector in meeting
this burden.
The proposal for a European data protection directive reiterates the
increased stakes for global businesses. As compared to the original draft of
261. See Bennett, supra note 4, at 217-19 (discussing the political grounding for differences
in privacy regulation).
262. See Reidenberg, supra note 69, at S142.
263. See Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kotz, 1 Introduction to Comparative Law 30-31 (Tony
Weis trans., 2d rev. ed. 1987).
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the proposal, the revised version emphasizes context evaluations, rather
than overall country assessments.2 By doing this, the revised draft
decreases the political power of lobby groups and reduces political
pressure that might have promoted unrestricted information flows despite
a lack of relevant standards! 65 As a result, scrutiny of data flows to the
United States will need to take place on an ever-increasing micro-level in
each of the European member states by the separate national data
protection authorities. Because key standards of transparency, finality, and
enforcement are often ignored by targeted standards in the United States,
the scrutiny on a micro-level of international data processing increases the
prospect that European regulators will restrict more data flows if the U.S.
private sector does not augment existing standards.
With the lack of key standards in many contexts, U.S. businesses
become forced to justify the legitimacy of data flows to the United States.
The lack of observable benchmark standards creates a presumption of
insufficient privacy. Foreign regulators must insist that all U.S. companies
show adequate protection for personal information. American companies
that implement serious standards of fair information practice are, in effect,
penalized by the absence of general legal rules. For these companies, the
targeted standards may supply adequate levels of fair information practice,
but because of the disappointing aggregation under the U.S. approach,
these companies must justify their practices to a variety of separate national
regulators. In effect, the companies that have actually implemented the set
of benchmark standards for fair information practices lose under the
targeted approach and those that do not implement fair practices will be
prevented from doing global business until they develop appropriate
standards.
B. Connecting U.S. Standards to the Global Information Infrastructure
Since few, if any, European data protection officials seek to "pull the
plug" on global networks, regulators and companies have engaged in an
active search to customize standards for transborder data flows. The
customization solution ironically reinvigorates the desire to minimize
restrictions on information flows and reliance on dispersed standards. A
reconceived contractual approach to bridging divergent standards of fair
information practices injects citizen participation and societal restraint on
the abuses of information power back into U.S. standards setting through a
new mix of both legal rules and industry norms and business practices.
1. A New Approach to the Contractual Solution
Academics, international organizations, and European government
agencies have proposed contractual solutions as a potential aid to the
transborder data-flow problem!se Under this model, a company that
264. See Reidenberg, supra note 56, at 294.
265. Id.
266. See G. Michael Epperson, Note, Contracts for Transnational Information Services:
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wishes to transfer personal information to a country without an omnibus
data protection law, like the United States, must first enter into a contract
with the recipient to protect the data protection rights of the individuals
concerned once the data is at the destination.!67
The contractual model, as presently conceived, however, suffers a
number of weaknesses. Because of the traditional contract doctrine of
privity in some European common- and civil-law jurisdictions, individuals
may not have any right against the recipient of personal information to
enforce fair information practices.2's If the contract is governed by
American law, the individuals may have a third party beneficiary claim.269
The model, though, also contemplates discrete information transfers,
rather than the complex network information processing arrangements
that may be the primary source of concern. Additionally, this contractual
model is not an adequate substitute for an effective managerial policy
toward personal information that implements fair information practices in
transnational contexts.2 °
The existing contractual solution seeks to give the individual
"primary" rights with respect to the data recipient. The contract itself is the
source of protection for individuals against the data recipient. This
situation suffers important substantive and instrumental weaknesses.
Individuals may be unable to enforce effectively their protections for the
treatment of personal information due to a lack of privity, the need to
obtain jurisdiction in a foreign country, or the difficulty establishing
foreign law in the local forum. In addition, the terms of the contract are
Securing Equivalency of Data Protection, 22 Harv. Int'l L.J. 157, 171-75 (1981); B.W. Napier,
Contractual Solutions to the Problem of Equivalent Data Protection in Transborder Data
Flows (paper presented at conference on "Legal Challenges and Opportunities Created by the
Prolific Grovth of Electronic Information Services," organized jointly by the Council of
Europe and the Commission of the European Communities, Luxembourg, March 27-28,
1990) (on file with the University of Iowa College of Law library); Model Contract to Ensure
Equivalent Data Protection in the Context of Transborder Data Flows with Explanatory
Memorandum, Council of Eur. Doc. T-PD (92) 7 revised (Nov. 2, 1992) [hereinafter Council
Model Contract] (on file with the University of Iowa College of Law library).
267. See D6liberation No. 89-78, reprinted in CNIL., supra note 259; Council Model
Contract, supra note 266.
268. &e Napier, supra note 266, at 24 (discussing the problem of privity in English law).
Other jurisdictions may not have the same privity problem, but conflict of law principles may
present an issue if parties go forum shopping. Furthermore, the typical contractual solution
contemplates very discrete transfers that are often atypical for information systems. &z
.Reidenberg, supra note 69, at S175. In addition, scope and enforceability issues remain. See
Ulrich Lepper, XIII Conference of Data Protection Commissioners 50-51 (1991) (paper
available from the Council of Europe).
269. SeeJoel R. Reidenberg, An American Solution to TBDF Personal Data Contractual
Problems, Privacy L. & Bus., Dec. 1991, at 12-14.
270. See William R. Whitehurst, Director of Data Security Programs, IBM, Remarks at the
Symposium on Model Contract Clauses and Their Use in Transborder Data Flows (May 6,
1993) (symposium organized by the International Chamber of Commerce, the Council of
Europe, and the Commission of the European Communities) (on file with tie University of
Iowa College of Law library).
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negotiated by the companies themselves with the input of data protection
authorities!" The exporting company acts, in effect, as the agent for the
individual, though the individuals have no direct representation during the
contract negotiations.
The reconception of the contractual model can avoid these inherent
problems. The reconceived model looks to contract as a by-product of
protection for individuals rather than a source of protection itself. This
reconception starts with an exporter's direct obligation to the individual to
adhere to the local standards 2 of fair information practice no matter
where the personal information goes. 5 The exporter remains responsi-
ble to the individual for the foreign treatment of any personal information
the company transfers. The foreign recipient becomes, in effect, the agent
of the exporter.24 This places the burden on exporters to demonstrate to
individuals, and to the local data protection authority, that the standards
actually being applied by the foreign recipient conform to the require-
ments of the exporting jurisdiction. The exporter has a form of strict
liability for the foreign treatment of any exported personal information.
Under this reconceived model, individuals can seek redress in their local
jurisdiction against the exporting company for the recipient's nonconform-
ing treatment of personal information. The individual's claim is based
directly on existing local data protection law and the export authority.
Under this reconceptualization, the implementation of standards for
foreign treatment of personal information becomes a private contractual
matter between the exporter and the recipient. Yet, because the exporter's
obligations depend upon the standards at the place of exporting, the
recipient must disclose its foreign practices and must commit to adhere to
appropriate practices. Unless the exporter knows what standards the
recipient will apply, and knows that the standards meet local requirements,
the exporter cannot meet its local obligations.
Once the recipient commits to appropriate standards, the exporter
will still need to supervise compliance. To this end, an exporter needs
some form of regular certification mechanism included in the contract to
assure that the recipient's processing conforms to the contractual
standards. Without some form of periodic audit, the exporter would fail to
conform to its own local obligations. Since the foreign recipient is not
271. Since the data protection authorities may block information transfers if they are not
satisfied with the arrangements, companies must consult with them on any contractual
arrangements.
272. Throughout this discussion, "local" refers to the jurisdiction where the data export
originates.
273. This parallels the new Quebec law that requires exporters to take reasonable
measures to assure the fair treatment abroad of any transferred data. An Act respecting the
protection of personal information in the private sector, ch. 17, 1993 S.Q. 503 (Can.) (to be
codified at R-S.Q. ch. P-39.1).
274. This reverses the assumption under the present view of contractual solutions that the
transferor is acting as an agent of the ilidividual concerned. SeNapier, supra note 266.
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subject to similar legal standards where it operates, the presumption is that
the recipient's practices do not conform to the exporter's local obligations.
Audit and certification is the only way for the exporter to show the
recipient's compliance with proper standards. Certification by an
independent outside audit could confirm compliance with the appropriate
standards to individuals and data protection authorities,25 though for
particular cases, the exporter would need to show that the standards were
followed in the specific instance.
There are precedents emerging in U.S. domestic practice that show
the viability of this approach. Several companies have recently established
"privacy audie' mechanisms. Others are improving transparency of
their business practices through corporate privacy advisor), boards. 7
Intercorporate arrangements are now starting to include greater
disclosure. 8
Under this new contractual approach, the local data protection
authority preserves its ability to protect the treatment of personal
information while decreasing disruption of international data flows. The
data protection authority retains supervisory power over the exporter and
leaves the question of the adequacy of foreign standards to the private
sector itself. Data protection authorities could also develop a useful role
serving as a consultative agency to determine foreign disclosure needs and
validate the quality of any outside auditor2 9
275. In Canada, the Canadian Standards Association is developing a mechanism for privacy
auditing. At least one large accounting firm has conducted a company privacy audit and other
experts have performed privacy audits for large companies.
276. For example, IBM has had a long-standing audit policy for personnel records. Within
the last five years, Equifax has hired an outside consultant to assess the privacy implications of
various company activities. TRW has instituted a rating mechanism to determine the privacy
sensitivity of new information uses. TRW/REDI, likewise, engages in regular privacy audits and
assigns internal officers to the task. Other companies, such as LEUS/NEXIS have more
informal privacy vetting procedures, usually centered on reviews of information products or
systems by key personnel.
277. These have three varieties. External boards involve outside consultants to advise on
fair Information practices. TRW and Equifax have followed this model Internal boards consist
of formal management committees of key personnel charged with considering privacy policy.
AT&T is an example of this approach. Finally, informal consultations consist of a group of key
personnel that considers a particular new problem or product on an ad hoc basis. U.S. West
and LEXIS/NEXIS have followed this process.
278. Aetna Insurance Company, for example, processes claims for many private insurance
plans. When Aetna acts as a third party claims processor, it requests that the client specify the
purposes for the claims information in writing, and the purpose must be related to the
relevant insurance plan. See Who's Reading Your Medical Records?, supra note 171, at 628; se--
e.g., U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Protecting Privacy in Computerized
Medical Information, 33-35 (Sept. 1993).
279. The Canadian Standards Association is presently studying models of fair information
practice auditing.
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2. Restoring Citizen Participation in the U.S. Private Sector with Limited
Government
The reconception of the contractual model ensures greater citizen
participation in foreign data processing. Individuals could directly
challenge an exporter in the individual's home country over the treatment
of personal information by foreign recipients. Because of the absence of
comparable legal rules at the information destination, foreign treatment of
personal information without dearly articulated standards cannot satisfy
the local requirements. The individual need not show noncompliance with
local standards; rather, the exporter must show that it has taken steps to
assure protection and that the recipient has implemented those steps. A
data protection authority could, likewise, require the exporter to
demonstrate that the standards of the exporting country are respected by
the foreign recipient.2 0 In each case, the burden falls on the exporter to
justify that foreign data processing meets the local standards. Absent
sufficient proof, the exporter fails to meet the local standards. Under this
structure, only a foolish exporter would fail to enter into a contract with
the recipient that allows the exporter to audit and control the processing
of the transferred personal information.
An important aspect to this reconceptualization is that the contract
remains a decision between the exporting and importing companies. The
implementation of data protection requirements at the destination is a
business deal. This is consistent with the American desire for minimal
government involvement. Self-interest forces the exporter to take data
protection provisions seriously. Similarly, the solution injects a data
protection authority into the calculus; any cautious exporter will necessarily
engage in consultations with the relevant data protection authority. Even
absent a notification requirement for foreign data transfers, an exporter
has much to gain by seeking assurances that the measures it envisions are
satisfactory. Few exporters would want the risk of liability in the exporting
jurisdiction.
The reconceived contractual model has an important transparency
effect in the United- States. Foreign companies will require that U.S.
trading partners disclose their U.S. information practices. Under the
foreign standards, the disclosure would be available to the concerned
individuals in the exporting jurisdiction. This reduces the possibility for
hidden manipulation of citizens. Although the direct beneficiaries of this
transparency are individuals with foreign-sourced personal information,
281
double standards are frequently problematic for corporate management.
The required disclosures are likely to prompt commitments by U.S.
companies to refrain from secondary use of transferred personal
280. This power may only be available where national data protection law requires
protection in the case of international transfers.
281. Many of these individuals are unlikely to be U.S. citizens or residents.
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information.
The commitments made by U.S companies to satisfy their foreign
counterparts are likely to have an important spill-over effect on U.S.
practice. Companies will be reluctant to provide fairer treatment for
foreign-sourced personal information than to U.S.-based information. The
pressure for good corporate citizenship makes it hard for a U.S. company
to justify treating foreign personal information with higher standards than
personal information of U.S. origin. Since information processing systems
are global systems, transparency and commitments in one part of the
network can circle back to other areas in the network.
The new contractual solution also introduces enforcement
possibilities. Individuals could pursue remedies against data exporters
according to the local data protection law. While individuals may not be
able to stop unfair foreign practices directly, the civil and criminal
penalties available under many national data protection laws provide a
powerful incentive for the exporter with potential liability to include
contractual controls over the information recipient, the exporter's "agent."
This supervision, however, preserves the philosophy of limited government.
The allocation of responsibility to the data exporter places the burden on
the exporter to assure compliance at the destination. If the exporter fails
to obtain sufficient disclosure, adequate commitments, and satisfactory
compliance certifications, the exporter would face liability for directly
violating the data protection law in the jurisdiction of export.
This arrangement establishes private contract rather than government
regulation as the prime source of standards between parties to
international data transfers; the local data protection law provides the
motivation. Yet, the role of the data protection authority would be
significant. As a matter of prudence, data exporters would consult with
data protection agencies to assure that contemplated arrangements are
satisfactory. For example, a data exporter would need to seek guidance
from the data protection authority to confirm that the disclosure is
adequate and that the audit mechanism is strong enough.
With enforcement in place for international data transfers, pressure
should build to establish U.S. standards that treat domestic data in the
same fair fashion. International data transfers will force exposure of U.S.
industry norms and business practices and give transparency to U.S.
companies' treatment of foreign-sourced personal information. Companies
will have to implement standards of fair information practice for at least
some personal information, and their partners will be able to penalize
them for failure to treat personal information properly. Without similar
standards of fair information practice in the United States, companies will
find it difficult to justify a double standard to the American public. At the
same time, the adoption of standards of fair information practice by
companies for their foreign information will make it easier to accommo-
date the extension of similar treatment to domestic data.
[1995]
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CONCLUSION
Business and citizen confidence in the "Information Superhighway"
will depend on their perception that there is fair treatment of personal
information. The ninimal restrictions on information through targeted
standards in the United States have not fulfilled the underlying goals nor
have they provided benchmark standards of fair information practice.
Foreign pressure will set the stage for new standards in the U.S. private
sector.
The call for standards of fair information practice is not a call for
interventionist or intrusive government regulation. The values of minimal
government and the possibilities of state abuses of power are ever-valid
policies. Instead, the call for standards is a call to equalize the playing
field. In an Information Society, the private sector has not satisfactorily
handled the making of norms through technical or corporate sources.
Industry trade groups are hampered in their ability to promote the
implementation of standards by their members. Individuals lack
representation in these groups, and the cross-industry and context-specific
uses of personal information defy a single point of view. Legal benchmark
standards are needed to force private sector companies to develop
appropriate information practices.
At the same time, the implementation and interpretation of any
standards must remain a flexible and private sector-driven exercise. The
significance of contextual evaluations for both domestic and international
analyses is that any given treatment of personal information has unique
characteristics that defy a generic assessment of "right and wrong."
The mix of conditions vigorously renews repeated calls for the
creation of a federal privacy commission in the United States. A
commission is now in the interests of the U.S. private sector and the
public. The development of a consensus on new standards with the
participation of government, citizens, and business will, in the long run,
directly benefit corporate America. The commission could provide a forum
for resolving the struggles between different internal corporate divisions
and society over the treatment of personal information.2 2 For the Global
Information Infrastructure, a U.S. privacy commission could also provide
valuable assistance to companies dealing with foreign data protection
authorities. Such a commission could also restore the United States to a
position of agenda setting for the treatment of personal information on
global networks; today, foreign data protection authorities monopolize the
agenda.
283
282. For example, tensions among marketing, security, and customer relations
departments will highlight different views of the treatment of personal information.
283. See Paul M. Schwartz, European Data Protection Law and Restrictions on Internation-
al Data Flows, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 47-1 (1995).
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